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Abstract
Since the early 1970s, the Indonesian Government has mounted a
major program of development in Irian Jaya, the nation's largest and
least densely populated province. Supported by international
assistance, the government has focused on improvement of
infrastructure and communications, expansion of health facilities and
educational opportunities and promotion of agriculture primarily
through the transmigration program. Government expenditure has
been the major stimulus to economic growth which has been
impressive compared with other provinces and also with
neighbouring Papua New Guinea. Hopes for substantial private
investment in resource based industries have not been fulfilled, and
largely primary export activities in fisheries and timber have had a
limited impact on regional income and welfare.
The distribution of economic change and its benefits has been
highly uneven, however, both in geographical terms and between
the indigenous population and migrants from elsewhere in
Indonesia. The northern towns and their hinterlands have
experienced increasingly intensive trade with Java and Sulawesi and
substantial labour inmigration from these islands. Income growth
has been stimulated by heavy investment infrastructure and
agricultural development in transmigration settlements. But
substantial natural and economic barriers to trade and
communications severely constrain potential spread effects from
economic growth in the north to the predominantly subsistence,
agricultural based indigenous communities in the highlands and
southern coastal regions. Although the government has given
considerable attention to extension of administration and educational
expansion in rural areas, insufficient attention to traditional
agriculture and smallholder exports has meant levels of living have
improved little for most of the indigenous population.
In the northern areas of rapid economic change, Irianese now
derive a much greater share of income from public administration
and service activities. But the major beneficiaries from urban growth
have been the immigrants who dominate small scale businesses in
trade, transport and construction, and new opportunities in
commercial agriculture. The control of many new economic
opportunities by the newcomers poses a major problem for the
provincial government. There are some signs of considerable concern
among the new generation of better educated Irianese politicians and
administrators, although their options for redressing the imbalance
are constrained by continuing tight security control, especially in
rural areas.
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Preface
The National First Five Year Plan (REPELITA I) and United Nations supported
fund for Irian Jaya initiated in 1969 administered the Fund for West Irian
(FUNDWI) program marked the beginning of a major program of development in
Irian Jaya. As elsewhere in Indonesia, rehabilitation and extension of infrastruc
ture and communications was the primary focus of the early development effort
aiming to stimulate private economic activities in agriculture and associated
sectors. Poor communications and low levels of education in Irian Jaya were
characteristics shared by other areas in eastern Indonesia, but this province faced
several unusual problems. There were major physical constraints to the extension
of government administration, trade, and labour mobility exacerbated by highly
dispersed patterns of human settlement; agriculture was largely subsistence
oriented; and both trade patterns and monetary structures imposed by the Dutch
were very different from those prevailing elsewhere in Indonesia. In addition
physical infrastructure was probably more run down in Irian Jaya in 1969 than
elsewhere in Indonesia as a result of 'export' and pilferage of capital and goods to
other areas of Indonesia in the early years of Indonesian control. The central
government and military were particularly concerned with security and problems
of unrest within the province, a factor limiting the pace of Irianization of the
administration, and making extension of administrative control a high priority in
government programs. Shortages of human capital were exacerbated by the
exodus of many Dutch and Irianese trained personnel in 1963 and at the time of
the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969 and the government seems to have been more
preoccupied with perceived problems of unskilled labour shortages than in many
other outer island provinces (see REPELITA IV Volume III: 764).
Also even more than in most other outer island provinces, economic change
for the large majority of the population has been heavily influenced by the large
and growing central government subsidy. This is a consequence of low levels of
intra-regional, inter-island and export trade coupled with low levels of
investment outside resource-based extractive activities. Income generation has,
therefore, been largely dependent on demand created by civil service salaries and
public investment in urban infrastructure, communications and, more recently,
transmigration projects. But probably more than anywhere else in Indonesia the
distribution of benefits flowing from the central government subsidy between the
indigenous population and migrants from other regions of Indonesia is a major
development issue in Irian Jaya. This is partly related to the large number of
interprovincial migrants principally moving to urban areas, and partly to recent
labour migration into Irian Jaya compared with other provinces. The high
proportion of migrants seconded to Irian Jaya to work in the government,
'spontaneous' migration of skilled and unskilled labour mainly from eastern
Indonesia and, since 1979, an expanded transmigration program have all created
tensions with the indigenous population. In the discussion of the impact of the
central government subsidy on regional development one must inevitably deal
with this issue, looking both at the direct employment and income distribution
effects of government policies and programs and also at the interaction between
migrant and indigenous economic activities.
These issues are not only important to an assessment of regional development
patterns in Irian Jaya. It is also necessary to raise them in the context of
international alarm generated by often ill-informed, selective and exaggerated
accounts of economic hardship and discrimination affecting Irianese welfare
contained in politically inspired reports of economic and social change in the
region in recent years (TAPOL 1983; Osbome 1985). Considerable data are now
available from Indonesian sources on the role of the indigenous population in
economic affairs over the past 15-20 years, and this monograph attempts a
comprehensive review of trends evidenced by these data. It is necessary to give
special attention to Irianese economic participation within the framework of
debates regarding the effects of economic development programs and from the
perspective of Irian Jaya's unique history and geopolitical situation.
Although the regional economy continues to remain highly fragmented, devel
opments over the past 15 years have brought major changes to the structure of
economic activity in the province. Government spending has grown rapidly,
extending road communications into inland areas close to the major cities, greatly
expanding educational facilities, extending administration and supporting a
major increase in transmigration. Major oil finds in the mid 1970s, copper exports
from Tembagapura and shrimp and tuna exploitation off Sorong and Biak have
all raised the contribution of resource-based products to regional product and
have become significant sources of revenue for the central government. As a con
sequence of more intensive sea communications with Java and eastern Indonesia
and integration of tariff structures within the national economy, almost all
consumer items purchased in the towns (outside the flow of vegetables and some
staple foods from hinterland regions) are imported from elsewhere in Indonesia.
These developments have stimulated trade, transport and construction industries,
encouraging inflow of labour and capital from eastern Indonesia and Java.
The impact of these changes has been, however, quite uneven. The majority of
Irianese continue to depend on subsistence oriented agriculture, livestock fishing
and hunting for a living, being little touched by new economic opportunities
opened up in urban areas and their hinterlands. Expansion of administration and
education have not been matched by significant inputs aimed at stimulating
indigenous economic activity. Traditional tree crop exports have stagnated in the
face of government preoccupation with food crop production in the urban
hinterlands and with the transmigration program. The issue of indigenous gains
from the large development effort is more pressing now than 15 years ago, and
the 1984 border crossings and associated unrest should be viewed in this light.
In this monograph we look first at the changing composition of public
expenditure and government policies and their overall impact on the distribution
of regional product and employment. The second section focuses on the urban
economies and particularly on the role of migrant labour in economic activities
and the significance of their presence for employment and income generation
among the indigenous population. A third section deals with enclave investments
in mining, oil, fisheries and forestry and their overall contribution to regional
development, employment and the incomes of local communities. Rural
development activities and how they have influenced the welfare of the local
population is the subject of the fourth section, and in the final section we examine
the transmigration program in some detail.
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CHAPTER 1
Regional Economic Change and
Public Finance
The structure of the Irian Jaya economy was highly fragmented when the first
Indonesian government development program was initiated in 1969.1 Subsistence
agriculture predominated both in small dispersed communities in coastal areas
and in the inland and more densely populated highland regions. These were cut
off from small urban settlements dotted mainly along the north coast depending
almost entirely on imports from abroad for food and other consumer goods. Poor
road and sea communications and the limited infrastructure established by the
Dutch (which had fallen into disrepair during the 1960s) were a major obstacle to
the development of trade links and the growth of commercial farming to serve the
needs of the towns. Linkages between urban centres and rural communities
depended on irregular air and sea transport; none of the kabupaten (regency)
capitals was linked by road and most highlands settlements could only be reached
by small mission planes. Aside from traditional barter trade, indigenous
commercial activity outside the towns consisted mainly of a minuscule flow of
exports from smallholder tree crops, timber and fish exploitation close to urban
areas and limited wage employment in government offices.
Population mobility within the province was severely hampered by poor
communications with foot paths providing the major means of access to urban
settlements and the chief vehicle for traditional trade between rural communities.
Migrant labour from elsewhere in Indonesia was still relatively small in numbers
and dominated mainly by Javanese middle and upper level civil servants who
had replaced both Dutch and Irianese administrators. The only resource based
venture of any significance was a small, declining oilfield at Klamono near Sorong
in the west of the province.
Although a very crude measure of economic activity in a highly fragmented and
subsistence dominated economy, the structure of regional gross domestic product
(GDP) in the early 1970s reflected these substantial barriers to trade and population
mobility. As elsewhere in Indonesia, agriculture was the dominant sector. But
unlike most other sparsely populated and resource-rich outer island provinces
where trade accounted for close to half of non-agricultural regional GDP, in Irian
Jaya this sector contributed only about one-fifth of this figure and less than ten per
cent of total regional product (Table 1.1). The manufacturing sector was tiny
(contributing less than one per cent of regional GDP) consisting mainly of coconut
oil production on the coast, small tailoring businesses, brick and tile making,
sawmilling, and a few food processing enterprises (bread and bottled soft drinks)
established during the Dutch period. The transport and construction industries
were not much larger; road transport was largely limited to movement within the
small urban settlements and construction activity depended heavily on the
relatively small government and FUNDWI development programs. The major
non-agricultural sectors were government and service activities, the latter
particularly prominent in Irian Jaya (and relatively much larger than any other
1 See Garnaut and Manning (1974) for a detailed account.
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Table 1 .1 Composition of regional product at constant prices by sector of activity, Irian
Jaya, 1971, 1980 and 1984
Sector Including minerals/oil Excluding minerals/oil
1971a 1980b 1984b 1971a 1980b 1984b
Agriculture 60 15 23 62 46 44
Mining/oil 3 67 49 .. ..
iManufacturing 1 (0.4) 1 1 1
Construction 3 2 4 5 5 7
Transport 3 2 4 3 8 8
Trade 5 6 8 5 19 16
Government admin. 12 4 8 12 13 17
Services 9 2 2 •10 5 5
Other 2 (0.6) 1 3 3 2
All sectors 100 100 100 100 100 100
(Rp billion) 52.6 976.2 847.5 51.1 317.9 433.8
Regional GDP per 57 832 652 55 271 334
capita (Rp 000)
fl973 prices.
bl 983 prices.
Sources: World Bank, Selected Aspects of Spatial Development in Indonesia Annex 4, Washington, D.C,
1984; Irian Jaya, BAPEDA and Kantor Staristik Tingkat 1, Pendapatan Regional Kabupaten dan Propinsi,
Irian Jaya 1984, Jayapura, 1985.
Indonesian province) due to the activities of mission organizations which provid
ed a wider range of services (mainly education but also health and agricultural
extension) to rural communities than the government. This distribution of regional
GDP was reflected in the composition of the urban work-force in 1971: nearly 60
per cent of non-agricultural employees (a total of approximately 30,000 persons)
were in services and a further 30 per cent in trade, transport and construction. 2
With the partial exception of Maluku, commercial agriculture was far less devel
oped than in any other province in Indonesia. Almost all cultivated land was devot
ed to staple food crops for local consumption. With the exception of sago (grown
widely in eastern Indonesia) most of these crops (notably taro and sweet potatoes)
were less common elsewhere in Indonesia. Similarly, crops grown elsewhere in
Indonesia were relatively rare in Irian Jaya. Even dryland padi was virtually
unknown to indigenous farmers and of far less significance even than in Maluku or
Kalimantan, and both corn and cassava hectarage was less significant than in other
Indonesian provinces. The reported total area devoted to export crops (copra, rub
ber, nutmeg and mace, cocoa and coffee) amounted to less than 20,000 hectares
(three-quarters of this planted to coconuts much of which were consumed locally),
a land area much smaller than that devoted to tree crops and smaller than in any
other outer island province (World Bank 1984: Annex 4). Exports of these commod
ities amounted to less than US$1 million, slightly over one dollar per capita. The
latter contrasts to the situation in Papua New Guinea where by the early 1970s tree
crop exports, mainly tea, cocoa and coffee, amounted to close to US$50 million.
Changing Economic Structure
Regional economic growth was impressive by both national and international
standards during the 1970s and early 1980s. Total regional GDP grew at around 7
2 The 1971 Census was conducted in urban areas only in Irian Jaya.
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per cent from 1971 to 1984 and excluding oil and mining by 10 per cent, the latter
implying nearly a fourfold increase in income at constant prices. Official data
suggest that all non-oil/mining sectors grew rapidly with construction, transport
and trade all growing above 10 per cent and agriculture, manufacturing and
government administration only slightly below this figure.3 In the period 1975-82
(for which comparable national accounts data are available for all Indonesian
provinces) total real regional GDP grew more slowly than in most other
provinces. But excluding oil and mining the annual growth rate in real regional
GDP (1975 prices) was above 10 per cent, much higher than the national average
(8.6 per cent) and growth rates achieved by other resource rich, underpopulated
provinces (Riau and East Kalimantan), most eastern Indonesia provinces
(including South Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggar, Timur and Maluku) and the more
heavily populated islands of Sumatra and Java. Real non-oil and mining regional
GDP per capita income grew at a respectable rate of around 5 per cent per annum,
again higher than in most other provinces.
Irian Jaya's aggregate economic performance from the mid 1970s was much
better than in Papua New Guinea where total GDP grew at only around 2 per cent
from independence to 1984, implying a slight decline in per capita income over a
nine-year period (Goodman, Lepani and Morawetz 1985: 34-43). In Papua New
Guinea, however, it is believed that incomes earned by nationals probably grew
much more rapidly than gross national product (GNP) whereas in Irian Jaya a
considerable share of regional income growth has almost certainly gone to
migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia and, from the mid 1970s, to the national
economy through a net outflow of public revenues derived from oil and copper
production and exports. On balance it seems likely that average incomes of the
indigenous population in Irian Jaya probably grew at least as fast as those earned
by Papua New Guineans but the gains from economic growth were probably
much less evenly distributed among the indigenous population in Irian Jaya. In
the discussion of both urban and rural economic change we shall argue that the
proportion of the local population who benefited from growth of the cash
economy in Irian Jaya was relatively small — fewer Irianese gained from new
employment opportunities in the towns or from expansion of cash cropping in
rural areas, a situation which contrasts markedly with the much wider diffusion
of economic change in most other outer island provinces and in Papua New
Guinea.
The major stimulus to economic growth has come from the greatly expanded
public budget and economic opportunities opened up by closer integration within
the national economy. Observers of the regional economy in the early 1980s
viewed investment in resource-based industries as a major potential stimulant to
future economic development in the province (Garnaut and Manning 1974). These
expectations have been realized only to a limited extent. Discovery of rich oil
deposits near Sorong in the 1970s and exports from the Freeport mine at
Tembagapura resulted in a substantial increase in the share of mining regional
GDP, contributing two-thirds of the total in 1980 (see Table 1.1). Once a major
drain on central government coffers, Irian Jaya became a net contributor to the
central government budget by 1980 with the value of total exports from the
province exceeding $500 million or about 3 per cent of national export earnings
A
These growth rates must be considered very crude estimates bearing in mind the substantial size and
largely unknown trends in production in the subsistence economy and considerable problems
involved in the estimation of regional accounts. In Table 1.1 data are presented on relative shares of
various sectors in regional GDP only; these at least give some indication of the changing structure of
the cash economy.
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(Table 1.2). This was supported by a much smaller but significant expansion in log
and fish exports which accounted for close to one-third of the total estimated
value of agricultural production in 1980. But although growth in oil and copper,
and to a lesser extent fish and timber exports contributed to rapid expansion of
regional GDP in the 1970s, regional product fell in the 1980s, largely because of a
decline in oil and timber production. The ban on log exports from Indonesia
implemented in 1985 in Irian Jaya (where, in contrast to some other regions,
plywood plants have not been established to compensate for the cutback in log
exports) contributed to a substantial fall in timber production and exports,
accompanied by the fall in the volume of oil exports as the wells in production
began to dry up.
Resource-based industries have continued, nevertheless, to dominate total
regional product in the 1980s, especially oil and minerals which contributed nearly
half of the total in 1984. But the impact of these activities on regional economic
activities was small. Exploitation and processing of resource-based products
employed around 10,000 workers: about 3000 in mining and oil projects and a
further 6000-7000 in timber and fishing industries. Almost all timber was exported
in the form of logs. Cold storage facilities were the only processing facilities
established for prawn and tuna export operations off Sorong. Almost all
government revenues from these enclave operations accrued to the central
government. Only in the Sorong region did the new investments appear to have a
significant impact on regional employment and income generation, trade in this
region accounting for an estimated one-third of all trade activities within Irian Jaya
in the early 1980s.
The direct and indirect impact of growth in government spending is
predominantly reflected in the growth of trade which by the early 1980s had
increased to close to 20 per cent of non-mining regional GDP. Employment data
suggest that this growth occurred mainly in urban areas. In contrast to most other
outer island provinces where trade sector employment was predominantly rural,4
the large majority (over 70 per cent) of employees in trade were living in urban
areas in 1980. The spread of market trading and the bazaar economy (the large
AMPERA market selling a wide range of consumer goods imported from Java and
South Sulawesi is an outstanding example) and substantial expansion of trade in
primary products produced within the province have been major developments
since the early 1970s. Nevertheless even in urban areas the proportion of tertiary
sector employment in trade was much lower than in any other Indonesian province
in 1980, reflecting continued dependence on imports from Java and Sulawesi for
urban consumption (see Chapter 2).
Government programs have also had a direct effect on employment in
construction and transport, the latter stimulated by the improvement and
extension of urban and feeder roads linking hinterland areas with the towns; both
sectors registered a significant rise in their share of regional GDP. Like trade,
transport employment was concentrated in urban areas. But construction activities
spread more widely, considerably influenced by the various Regional Public
Works programs under special Presidential Instruction (INPRES) programs and
road construction projects.
Manufacturing on the other hand has not increased its share of regional product
over the past 15 years. After increasing slowly in real terms in the 1970s this sector
recorded steady growth in the 1980s linked to the growth of timber-based activities
to meet construction and urban consumer demand and the processing of some
4East Kalimantan is a notable exception to this pattern.
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foodstuffs— tahu, tempe, bread and coconut oil — for town consumption. But
other consumer goods industries, most notably soft drink manufacture, previously
enjoying natural protection as a consequence of Irian Jaya's isolation from
international and Indonesian markets now found it increasingly difficult to
compete with cheaper imports from elsewhere in Indonesia. The share of the
manufacturing sector in non-oil regional GDP was only one per cent in 1980 and
1985, very much lower than in most other outer island provinces with the exception
of Maluku, Southeast Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and
Bengkulu in 1980, and the share of total employment in manufacturing lower only
in Maluku and Bengkulu in 1980 (MUDS 1985).
The share of agriculture in non-mining regional product has declined (as in
most other outer island regions), despite both a significant increase in cash
cropping close to urban areas— partly related to the expansion of the
transmigration program—and a reported increase in the real value of food and
livestock production in the province since 1971. In part this reflects the stagnation
of traditional tree crop exports which had increased little since the early 1970s.
Food crop production in inland and highland areas continued to remain largely
subsistence oriented, little touched by the growth of urban settlements.
New economic activities in the province were concentrated in the north coast
kabupaten, particularly the capital Jayapura and Sorong, which accounted for a
large share of the urban population but for only about 40 per cent of the total
population of the province. Over half of the provincial value of manufacturing,
construction, transport and trade was recorded in Jayapura and Sorong, and
around 70 per cent of these sectors and government administration in the north
coast kabupaten in 1984 (Table 1 .3).
Migrant labour from South Sulawesi and Java played an important role in all
these sectors chiefly in the northern towns, and has been the major beneficiary of
modern sector growth (see Chapter 2). In the southern kabupaten of Merauke and
Fak-Fak and the highlands, non-agricultural activity was largely dominated by
government administration and trade, with the highlands kabupaten producing
nearly 60 per cent of the estimated food production in Irian Jaya. Non-oil regional
GDP per capita was lowest in the southern kabupaten, less than one-third of that
recorded for Jayapura and Sorong, despite the greatly increased number of
transmigrants moving to the province since 1979 and the predominance of
traditional export crops in this area. Although efforts are being made to break the
isolation of the highlands regions through the construction of the trans-Irian high
way, it will be many years before natural barriers to trade and labour mobility are
broken down. Lack of integration of the growing urban-oriented economies in the
north with economic activities in the highlands and southern regions remains a
major development problem in Irian Jaya.
To sum up, economic growth has been remarkably rapid in Irian Jaya during
the 1970s and early 1980s. This phenomenon was not particularly dependent on
the reported rich natural resource base of the province but rather on the expan
sion of all sectors of the regional economy, and especially the non-agricultural sec
tors supported by high levels of central government subsidy. In per capita terms
total GDP was extremely high by national standards in 1980 (but excluding oil
and mining, much closer to the national average), lower than in the wealthier
provinces of Sumatra and Kalimantan (North and South Sumatra, and East
Kalimantan) and considerably higher than in the poorer Java and eastern
Indonesian provinces (Central Java, East and West Nusa Tenggara, Southeast and
Central Sulawesi). But per capita incomes were probably distributed more un
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Table 1 .3 Distribution of regional product by sector in various regions of Irian Jaya,
1984 (constant 1983 prices)
North coast Southern High- Total Percent
Jayapura/Islands regions'* landsc excl.
Sorong Manokwaria mining
Percentage 27 15 22 36 100
of population
Agriculture 33 12 12 43 100
Food and livestock (17) (13) (11) (59) 100
Perennial crops (14) (7) (79) - 100
Fisheries & forestry (78) (13) (7) (2) 100
Mining and oil 86 - 14 - 100
Manufacturing, 54 25 16 10 100
construction
and transport
Trade 57 16 8 15 100
Government admin. 41 26 17 15 100
Total regional GDP 64 10 13 13 100
Non-oil regional 43 19 12 26 100
GDP
Non-oil regional 645 491 212 269 334
GDP per capita
(Rp'000)
44
(32)
(1)
(11)
16
16
17
aDiak-Numfor and Yapen-Waropen
kMerauke and Fak-Fak
cjayawijaya and Paniai.
Source: Irian Jaya, BAPEDA and Kantor Statistik, Pendapatan Regional Kabupaten Dan Propinsi Irian
Jaya 1984, Jayapura, 1985
evenly within Irian Jaya: between the more accessible and more nationally
integrated northern kabupaten on the one hand and the highlands and southern
kabupaten on the other; between urban and rural areas; and between the migrant
population and indigenous Irianese. An indication of the latter two patterns is
given by national expenditure data which suggest that the incidence of recorded
urban poverty was relatively low by Indonesian standards, indeed lower than in
any other province with the exception of North Sumatra, but rural poverty was
recorded as higher than almost all other outer island provinces with the exception
of South Sulawesi and the Nusa Tenggara provinces (NUDS 1985).
Public Finance and Development Programs
In the early 1970s central government expenditure in Irian Jaya was high
compared with other relatively sparsely populated, outer island provinces. This
expenditure was mainly directed to the provision of high salaries of civil servants,
government administrative costs and a range of subsidies to goods and services,
most notably rice and fuel. By the mid 1980s the size of the government sector had
grown considerably in real terms, with expenditure in the 'development' budget
and transmigration now accounting for a large share of the total. Due to the low
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Table 1 .4 Composition of government expenditure, Irian Jaya, 1970-72 and 1984/85
Average annual budget
1970-72* 1984/85b
Rp billion Percent Rp billion Percent
Routine budget
Personnel 5.4C 31.0 38.6 21.0
Other 6.3 36.0 11.8 7.0
(11.7) (77) (50.4) (28)
Development
budget/INPRES 38.0 21.0
Govt depts:
Trans-migration 5.6 33.0 43.2 24.0
Other 49.4 27.0
Subtotal 5.6 (33) (130.6) (72)
All government
expenditure 17.3 100 181.0 100
$USm 43.0 181.0
aPlanned expenditure.
bRealized routine expenditure, planned development expenditure.
Includes estimated allocation to kabupaten personnel.
Sources: R. Garnaut and C Manning, Irian Jaya: The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy, ANU
Press, Canberra, 1974: 45-7; Irian Jaya, BAPEDA and Kan tor Statistik Tingkat 1, Pendapatan Regional
Kabupaten dan Propmsi Irian Jaya 1984, Jayapura, 1985.
level of commercial activity outside the enclave mining sector, revenue collected
in the province remained a small proportion of total government revenue. Major
development expenditure continued to be channelled into develop-ment of
communications and infrastructure, with construction of road networks
assuming far greater importance towards the end of the decade. As in other
regions, the various INPRES programs (in particular the primary school building
program) assumed far greater significance in the early 1980s.
Table 1.4 indicates the changing composition of total expenditure in
various programs in Irian Jaya in the period 1970-72 and the budget year
1984/85. The decline in the share of the routine budget from close to 80 per
cent in the early 1970s to less than 30 per cent in 1984/85 is largely a result of
the reduction in the role of non-salary expenditure items. The special rice
subsidy to Irian Jaya which held prices below those prevailing elsewhere in
Indonesia was removed in the early 1980s, and the special branch of the
Department of Internal Affairs (Sektor Khusus Irian Jaya) established to
coordinate government programs in Irian Jaya was disbanded in the mid
1970s. The development budget in 1984/85 was fairly evenly distributed
between the various INPRES programs (INPRES DATI I and II, INPRES
Penunjang Jalan Kabupaten, INPRES Sekolah Dasar and others), central
government departmental allocations to development projects in Irian Jaya
and the transmigration program. In 1984/85 the latter alone exceeded the
total value of all INPRES programs undertaken in Irian Jaya and was only
slightly below the total value of the routine budget.
5 The 1984/85 allocation to transmigration was relatively high compared with annual REPELITA III
allocations and thus slightly overstates the relative importance of transmigration in total expenditure
in the 1980s.
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These figures, however, somewhat overstate the actual size of departmental
development spending since realized expenditure fell well short of budget
allocations (by an estimated 50-60 per cent of departmental budgets in the mid
1980s). The decline in central government allocations for 1986/87 to government
departments—departmental budget allocations were more than halved in
1986/87 and the transmigration budget reduced by over 60 per cent compared
with the previous year— owing to central government budget revisions in light
of declining oil revenues will not affect development programs in Irian Jaya on a
scale implied by the budget cuts. The major impact is likely to be felt through the
influence of a much smaller transmigration program on construction employment
and associated spending in urban areas.
The province has remained heavily dependent on central government
subsidies as shown in Table 1.5. Although as a percentage of total government
revenues these were not far below central government grants to several other less
developed outer island provinces, per capita grants to Irian Jaya were
approximately double those made to selected resource rich and isolated provinces
outside Java in 1984/85. This is partly a consequence of the large size of Irian
Jaya's routine budget, primarily related to continuing high civil service salaries—
basic salaries (excluding allowances) are 60-80 per cent higher than in other
provinces due to the special Irian Jaya allowance—and the relatively large
number of civil servants involved in government administration in the province.
Table 1 .5 Provincial government budget receipts (APBD) in selected provinces, 1984/85
Riau East
Kalimantan
Central
Kalimantan
Maluku Irian
Jaya
Routine budget 35.2 30.2 22.8 27.8 52.9
total (Rp billion)
Provincial receipts 24 27 11 5 4
as per cent of totala
Development budget 303 30.0 26.2 21.2 14.6
total (Rp billion)
Provincial receipts/ 33 35 21 10 7
income returned by
central govt as percent
of total
Total budgetb 65.8 60.2 59.0 49.0 67.5
Central govt subsidy 54 51 50 67 85
as per cent of total
Total population 500 1400 1100 1600 1300
1984 C000)c
Central govt. subsidy 14 22 27 21 44
per capita (Rp '000)
Total budget 26 43 54 31 52
per capita (Rp '000)
aIncludes IPEDA and forestry taxes (IHH and IHPH).
blncludes carryover from previous year.
cEstimate based on population growth rates 1971-80 except for East Kalimantan (assume 3 per cent
annual growth rate).
Source: Indonesia, Department Kenangan, Rencana Anggaran Belanja Negara, various years.
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Revenues raised in the province were derived from the same principal sources as
in other regions of Indonesia— vehicle registration and sales taxes allocated to the
routine budget, and the land tax (IPEDA), forestry-licence fee (IHPH) and forestry
royalty (IHH) returned to the provincial government for allocation to the
provincially managed development budget (APBD). These sources contributed
well over 90 per cent of total provincial government revenue—amounting to
about Rp 3 billion in 1984/85.
As noted above, however, Irian Jaya was certainly a net contributor to central
government revenues from the late 1970s, with income derived from mining and
oil operations contributing about Rp 200-300 billion to Jakarta's budget in the mid
1980s. Income from these sources and forestry royalties have declined substantial
ly, however, in recent years following the ban on timber exports and falling oil
production.
As in other provinces the allocation of development expenditures through a
variety of government INPRES programs and central government departmental
budgets has made it difficult to gauge the overall impact on various sectors of
economic activity, has reinforced central government control of development
budget allocations and has increased the difficulty of planning and evaluating
regional development efforts.
Communications and infrastructure
A very high proportion of total development expenditure outside the
transmigration program has gone into infrastructure development and
communications, both through the INPRES programs and central government
department budget allocations (Tables 1.6 and 1.7). The beginnings of the
trans-Irian highway, construction of primary schools and extension and
rehabilitation of urban and feeder roads associated with hinterland and
transmigration development have been the major areas of government
expenditure. Around 70-80 per cent of all INPRES grants went to the
development budget managed by the provincial government and the primary
school building program, with kabupaten road building and maintenance and
direct grants to kabupaten administration taking a further 13-18 per cent in
REPELITA III and IV. The balance was allocated to health programs, rural
development projects with a small allocation for construction of market facilities.
The share of total development expenditure allocated to the seven INPRES
programs has increased over time and, given substantial delays in the
implementation in major road construction and transmigration projects funded by
government departments, accounted for a higher share of total development
expenditure than the 27-28 per cent allocation figures suggest for the period
1979/80-1985/86 (see Table 1.6).
In REPELITA III (1979-84) and IV (1984-89) a high proportion— approximately
one third — of the INPRES development budget managed by the province and al
most all the INPRES kabupaten grants have gone to road and bridge construction
within major towns and on road links with nearby agricultural areas. Road con
struction work has also received a major share of the large public works depart
mental allocation in recent years. A start has been made on the ambitious plan for a
provincial highway system linking kabupaten capitals, and considerable attention
given to road construction projects related to transmigration projects. In all, proba
bly between one third and half of the provincial budget outside transmigration has
been spent on road construction and rehabilitation over the past seven years.
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Table 1.6 Development budget allocations by program, Irian Jaya REPELITA III and
REPELITA IV
Rp billion
REPELITA in REPELITA IV
1984/85
-1985/86 1986/87
Per cent
REPELITA III REPELITA IV
1984/85
-1985/86 1986/87
INPRES programs 27 28 44
Provincial grants
kabupaten grants
33.4
6.8
19.0
3.8
11.9
2.0
35 27 31
57 6
kabupaten roads 9.8 8.2 3.0 11 12 8
Primary school 33.6 305 18.3 36 44 48
bldgs
Health 4.4 45 1.6 4 7 4
Markets 1.9 -
15
. 2 - -
Rural devel 4.9 19 5 4 4
opment
Subtotal 94.8 69.3 38.3 100 100 100
Presidential 2.1 0.1 - 1 (-) -
grants
Central 255.7 181.2 48.1 72 72 56
government
epartments
Total 352.6 250.5 86.4 100 100 100
Total per annum 70.5 125.2 86.4
Source: Irian Jaya, BAPEDA, unpublished data, August 1986 and Kantor Statistik Tingkat 1,
Pendapatan Regional kabupaten dan Propinsi Irian Jaya 1984, Jayapura, 1985.
Table 1.7 Composition of central government department budget allocations by major
sector of activity, Irian Jaya, 1969-72, REPELITA III and REPELITA IV
1969/70
1971 /72a
REPELITA III REPELITA IV
1984/85 1986/87
1985/86
Excluding transmigration [100] [80] [60] [78]
Public works 7 37 19 40
Communications 56 17 14 9
Education 12 14 24 18
Health 4 4 5 3
Social affairs 3 9 4M
10Agriculture, fisheries 15 6 7
and forestry
(Agriculture) 5 9b 5b..
19 19Other 6 19
Subtotal 100 100 100 100
Transmigration - 20 40 22
All sectors 100 100 100 100
Rp billion -
excl. transmigration 16.6 205.3 109.0 37.4
Transmigration - 50.4 72.2 10.7
Total 16.6 255.7 181.2 48.1
^Includes FUNDWI budget and counterpart allocations and PELITA budget
Includes fisheries.
Sources: Irian Jaya, BAPEDA, unpublished data, August 1986 and Kantor Statistik Tingkat 1,
Pendapatan Regional kabupaten dan Propinsi Irian Jaya 1984a, Jayapura, 1985; R. Garnaut and C. Manning,
Irian Jaya: The Transformation ofa Melanesian Economy, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974:49.
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This marks a substantial shift in allocations compared with REPELITA I and
the FUNDWI program in the early 1970s in which just on half of the total
development budget was allocated to air and sea communications. The latter ef
forts were pressing priorities in the early 1970s with the deterioration in wharves
and airstrips in the 1960s, the poor conditions of shipping available for local
trade and the urgent need to develop administration networks throughout the
province. Improvements to port facilities and upgrading of most major
kabupaten airstrips to receive jet aircraft, additions to the major airstrips at Biak
and Jayapura to facilitate better communications with Jakarta, Surabaya and
Ujung Pandang, and the extension of several smaller strips to service Twin Otter
aircraft have, nevertheless, continued to receive a considerable share of
departmental expenditure. Together with extension of telecommunications
networks— installation of satellite-linked automatic telephone systems in Biak
and Jayapura and introduction of television relay stations in all the kabupaten
capitals— these activities have accounted for around 10-15 per cent of the non-
transmigration development budget in recent years. These have all contributed
to much improved communications, transport and trade links with major
commercial and administrative centres elsewhere in Indonesia.
Some of these expenditures have helped to alleviate the isolation of rural
communities, especially the feeder roads from towns to hinterland areas on the
north coast around Jayapura, Biak, Manokwari and Sorong,6 and a network of
simple village roads in the highlands centred around Wamena in the densely
populated Balim valley, Bokondini and Oksibil.7 Their impact on indigenous
economic activity has nevertheless been limited by much slower growth in
commercial agricultural activities undertaken by the local population and the
domination of urban commercial activities by migrants in many areas (see
below). The large majority of villagers continue to carry their goods to the busy
Wamena market on foot; there is virtually no public transport in the highlands
and the major benefits from these developments appear, at this stage, to have
been in facilitating government administration, security and limited extension
services.
Provincial planners place considerable hopes in a trans-Irian highway
network, integrated with denser population settlements promoted through
transmigration, as a major means of 'opening up' inland areas and promoting
development in Irian Jaya. So far major construction has occurred south from
Jayapura through Arso to Ubrub (approximately 150 kilometres) and north from
Merauke to Muting (250 kilometres), both close to the sensitive border areas
with the difficult sections into the highlands still to be constructed. Progress has
been slow and costly partly due to inadequate land surveys and access to aerial
maps.8 Costs per kilometre of the gravel reinforced road have been high and
gravel roads too expensive to construct in the Merauke area because of the
complete absence of raw materials. As a consequence, the section of the road
running north of Merauke is virtually impassable except by 4-wheel drive
About 500 kilometres of asphalt roads with regular public transport were almost entirely
concentrated in these four areas in 1985 although gravel roads (about 700 kilometres in 1985) were
spread more widely. The total 4600 kilometres of roads in 1985 (60 per cent dirt roads) had increased
more than fivefold since the early 1970s.
7 By the mid 1980s about 700 kilometres of village roads had been constructed in upland Jayawijaya
and about 300 kilometres in Paniai kabupaten.
Construction of part of the section north of Merauke into Papua New Guinea territory caused a
major upset in 1984 before the error was taken care of.
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vehicles, and these encounter difficulties during the wet season due to flooding.9
Given these problems on what is viewed by most observers as by far the easiest
part of the road network, the potential economic benefits of the trans-Irian
highway must be viewed with some scepticism, especially at a time when funds
allocated for maintenance of roads and bridges are likely to be even scarcer than
in the past. Opening of highlands regions to land communications with the north
coast could greatly reduce the costs of development programs but in the south the
large areas of swamp and heavy wet season flooding suggest that reduction of
extremely high transport costs will depend on improvement to relatively
neglected river transport.
Education
A major share of the development budget has gone to education, mainly to the
INPRES primary school building program in the past eight years. This program
accounted for over one-third of all INPRES allocations in REPELITA III and closer
to half in REPELITA IV, with all expenditure on education amounting to just on 20
per cent of total development budget allocations over the period 1979/80-1986/87.
These very large allocations to education have radically increased school enrolment
ratios with numbers in primary schools almost doubling and in secondary schools
increasing more than sixfold since the early 1970s.
In 1980 school enrolment for ages 7-12, 13-15 and 16-18 were estimated to be
67, 58 and 33 per cent of children in these age groups respectively.10 These figures
are a poor guide to enrolment ratios in secondary schools for the relevant age
groups, however, given the late age of entry into newly constructed schools
especially in the highlands kabupaten and in inland areas generally. Thus school
statistics suggest lower and upper secondary school enrolment of 30 and 14 per
cent respectively in 1980, levels fairly similar to those recorded in many other
Indonesian provinces. By the mid 1980s enrolment in primary, lower and upper
secondary schools had probably increased to around 80, 50 and 20 per cent
respectively largely as a consequence of expansion in government school building
programs. Mission schools still accounted for over half of primary and lower
secondary enrolments and about one-third of upper secondary enrolments in the
early 1980s, but the relative importance of totally government funded and
administered institutions had increased considerably."
As elsewhere in Indonesia vocational secondary schooling has been given less
attention than academic (SMP, junior secondary and SMA, upper secondary)
schooling, the latter having been largely phased out at the lower secondary level
and accounting for a little over half of upper secondary school enrolments in 1984
(mainly in Economics, Economics (Vocational) Senior High School (SMEA),
schools and the Sekolah Technic Menengah (STM) technical schools). As might be
expected, the capital Jayapura and north coast kabupaten accounted for a high
9 See, for example, a report by Peter Hastings on a trip north from Merauke in 1983 (Sydney Morning
Herald, 30 August 1983).
10 The census data suggest relatively small sex differences in enrolment rates except at senior high
school where female rates were about half those recorded for males. Provincial data report the
number of enrolments in primary schools at around 155,000 in 1980/81, 25 per cent higher than the
census data for enrolments recorded for age groups 7-12 in the 1980 census, and also certainly an
overstatement of actual numbers of primary school children in 1980.
11 It is reported, for example that enrolments in mission primary schools had fallen from about 85 per
cent in 1970 to 59 per cent in 1982/83. It should be noted that the government provides subsidies for
the salaries of teaching staff in mission schools.
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proportion of all secondary school enrolments—Jayapura, Sorong, and Biak
kabupaten taking over half of all enrolments (including nearly 75 per cent of senior
high vocational enrolments) in 1984. In contrast the highlands kabupaten support
ed a much smaller number of secondary schools and pupils, amounting to less
than 20 per cent in 1984.
This impressive government record of support for schooling needs some
qualification. The speed of construction of primary schools has outpaced both
enrolments and the supply of teachers available particularly in inland areas. Many
of the new buildings were underutilized in the mid 1980s, often located too far from
population settlements. The strict central government specifications regarding the
size of schools and teaching systems— the objective of having one teacher for each
class— has often been ill-suited to the need for smaller more widely dispersed
institutions run by one or two teachers. Major constraints have been imposed by a
serious shortfall in the number of qualified teachers— only half of the highlands
kabupaten requirement for teachers was achieved by 1982/83 — and by poor
qualifications of the teaching staff employed. 12
The shortfall in teachers has been partly met by part-time teaching by other
government officials in primary schools and shortened class hours, but low
teacher : pupil ratios in many areas have probably contributed to a low standard
of primary schooling.13 Relatively constant enrolments at SPG, teacher training
schools over the past 15 years (see Table 1.8) and difficulties in recruiting teaching
staff from elsewhere in Indonesia reflect the reluctance of young people to staff
isolated village school posts, a situation not helped by conditions of uncertain
security in many inland areas which have encouraged a high turnover among
Table 1.8 Enrolments at various levels of education, Irian Jaya, 1970 and 1984
Educational level /type of school 1970 1984
Primary 123,700 212,900
Lower secondary 8698 38,086
General 4,788 37,582
Vocational 3,910 504
Upper secondary 1,700 14,598
General 952 9,846
Technical 208 1,102
Other 540 3,650
Teacher training(secondary) 3,346(?) 2,612
Tertiary 632 3,020
Law/politics andsociology 1,264
Education/teacher training .. 1,285
Agriculture •• 471
Sources: Irian Jaya, Kantor Statistik Tingkat 1, Irian ]aya Dalam Angka 1984, Jayapura, 1985; R. Garnaut
and C. Manning, Irian Jaya: The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974: 26,
30.
12 About 40 per cent of all teachers in primary schools in the province were reported to be under-
qualified in 1982/83 (that is, had not received basic Teachers Senior High School (SPG) teacher
training). See Irian Jaya (1984).
13 In Jayawijaya regency the pupil : teacher ratio was reported to average 50 in 1984, about double the
rates in other kabupaten.
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teachers. In the early 1980s special six month courses in teacher training were
instituted for academic school (SMA) graduates in an attempt to quickly raise the
number of qualified teaching staff, but the provincial government sees this
program as largely a stop-gap measure in view of immediate constraints to
increasing SPG enrolments.
The general emphasis in curriculum at primary school levels on preparing
students for secondary education is particularly questionable in rural Irian Jaya.™
Low levels of participation in the modern sector and non-agricultural activities in
rural areas, combined with little prospect of significant change in these conditions
in the medium term, suggest the need for far more vocationally-oriented courses
related to present challenges in agricultural development.
Provincial planners are aware of these needs but have relatively little say in the
development of curriculum. The rapid spread of secondary education on the other
hand raises expectations for salaried employment which is likely to expand much
less rapidly than in the past and increasingly it is likely to create unrest among
discouraged, secondary educated job seekers, especially in urban areas.
Tertiary education has also expanded substantially through government
grants principally to Cenderawasih University and the Civil Service Training
Institute (APDN) administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs.15 Enrolments at
the University of Cenderawasih have increased about fivefold since 1970 with
over 1500 and 200 students graduating at the Bachelor of Arts (sarjana muda) and
five-year tertiary degree (sarjana) levels respectively by the end of 1984. About 50
students, nearly half from the education faculty, were graduating annually at the
sarjana level, by the mid 1980s. The university together with the APDN, the latter
catering almost solely for Irianese and producing about 50 graduates annually in
the mid 1980s, have probably provided sufficient graduates to fill new
government positions since the early 1980s. In previous years, in addition to the
inflow of trained personnel from outside the province, shortfalls in the supply of
educated workers had to some extent been met through central and provincial
government scholarships for Irianese to study in Java. Although many bright
graduates elected not to return to Irian Jaya, the total number trained this way has
probably exceeded the number of graduates from institutions in Irian Jaya.16 With
the cutback in central government funding and private sector activities in
resource-based industries, the prospect of a surplus of graduates is imminent.
One final point should be made in relation to the impact of government
programs on the educational status of the population. At senior high school and
tertiary levels, the growth in the educational status of the indigenous population
has been much smaller than the figures suggest. Local Irianese compete with
migrants and their children—mainly the children of civil servants in educational
institutions, especially in the towns. Over half the enrolments in Cenderawasih
University were non-Irian born in 1970. This proportion has probably not
changed significantly since then. Unofficial sources suggest non-Irian born
14 Targets for lower secondary school expansion are set on the basis of estimated numbers of primary
graduates in the various kabupaten.
15 Several privately funded tertiary institutions mainly in the fields of management and economics
offering sarjana muda and diploma degrees have also been established over the past decade mainly
taking in civil servants on a part-time basis.
16 Mention should also be made of the quite large numbers of Irianese trained in the Protestant and
Catholic theological colleges (Theological Institute (STT), Indonesian Council of Churches (GKI) and
Institute of Philosophy and Theology (STFT)) which have for more than a decade produced many of
the informal leaders in Irian Jaya.
16 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRIAN JAYA
children and children born to migrants in Irian Jaya still accounted for about half
of the intake in 1985/86 and two-thirds in 1986/87. The high proportion of
non-Irianese among graduates from the university has tended to entrench the
prominent role of migrants in highly skilled administrative and professional
positions in the modern sector, and the continuation of a large share of new
enrolments allocated to non-Irianese suggests this pattern is unlikely to change in
the near future.
Agriculture
The third major area of government spending has been agriculture (including
fisheries and forestry), accounting for about 15-20 per cent of the provincial
government development budget (APBD) and 5-10 per cent of allocations to
government departments in recent years. A considerable proportion of allocations
in both budgets and probably about half of the total budget allocated to
agriculture has gone to projects aimed at supporting transmigration
projects— the provision of subsidized Bimbingan Massal Rice Intensification
Support Program (BIMAS) inputs and equipment for rice production in Merauke
and Sorong in particular. Other allocations have been made to a wide variety of
projects: equipment and training in fisheries mainly off Sorong; import and
distribution of seedlings, and establishment of seed distribution centres and
demonstration plots for commercial crops (coconuts, coffee, cocoa, rubber, sugar
cane and cashew nuts); and distribution of livestock on a credit, production
sharing basis. These projects have been spread widely throughout the province
with food crop programs concentrated in hinterland areas close to the major
towns and in transmigration settlements. In the highlands major emphasis has
been on introduction and distribution of new seeds for food production,
introduction of sheep and pigs under INPRES and departmental budget programs
and opening of small areas for sawah (wet rice field) rice cultivation (50 hectares
had been prepared by mid 1986) in the Baliem valley close to Wamena. The
impact of these programs has been severely limited by lack of extension workers
and access to relatively isolated, dispersed communities.
Other sectors
Expenditure in other sectors outside transmigration can broadly be divided
into two categories: development of urban facilities and rural development pro
grams. In the first category the major allocations have been in development of
urban water supplies, electricity, hospital facilities, and the construction of
government offices. Rural development programs outside the primary school
building program have concentrated on construction of rural PUSKESMAS in
kecamatan (district) centres, village INPRES grants to selected villages especially
for churches and mosques, resettlement of small numbers of villagers (several
thousand households in the past decade) into larger village units, construction of
model housing units and the building and equipment of government offices
mainly at the kecamatan level but also in selected villages close to kecamatan.
Sixteen kecamatan had been established in the highlands kabupaten of Jayawijaya
and Paniai by the early 1980s with kecamatan closest to the kabupaten capitals being
the focus for rural development programs. Government reports stress the limited
impact of infrastructure and social development programs beyond these areas
due to communication problems.
Both government and privately funded activities in the field of health have
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expanded substantially in recent years especially through the INPRES program
for the establishment of PUSKESMAS throughout the province17 and, since 1984,
through the activities of the Bethesda Health Foundation in coordinating
government and mission allocation of medical supplies and the payment of
salaries to paramedical staff in outlying areas. Despite continued shortages of
medicine and equipment, there is some indication that these efforts, together with
improved communications, have probably contributed to a significant decline in
mortality in many areas since the late 1960s.18 But, nevertheless, the relatively
small total budget allocations for health through INPRES and departmental
budgets are one particular area of concern particularly in view of the continued
widespread incidence of malaria in most north coast regions. Although infant
mortality is estimated to have been higher and life expectancy lower in several
other provinces (mainly in eastern Indonesia) in 1980, in the area of health the
development record contrasts with that of Papua New Guinea. In Papua New
Guinea total expenditures amounted to around 7-8 per cent of the budget in the
early 1980s and it has been suggested that 'primary health facilities are within the
reach of most people' in 1985 (Goodman, Lepani and Morawetz 1985: 166, 236). In
Irian Jaya allocations to health were only 3-4 per cent of the total development
budget outside transmigration in the past decade, despite relatively low life
expectancy (estimated at 51 for males and 54 for females in 1980) and rates of
infant mortality (127 in 1980) that were considerably higher than in Papua New
Guinea.19
17 The number of PUSKESMAS accounted to 125 in 1986, covering most of the 117 kecamatan in Irian
Jaya. These were heavily understaffed including only 35 doctors and 23 formally trained paramedic
staff (mantri and bidan) (see Kompas 6 December 1986:9).
18 Mission surveys suggest that the P5 health and nutrition program significantly reduced infant
mortality but the samples were too small (and basis for calculations unclear) to enable generalizations
to be drawn even about the survey population.
19 Infant mortality was estimated at 117 for Indonesia as a whole and a much lower 72 in Papua New
Guinea in 1980, the latter declining by 46 per cent in the period 1971-80 (Goodman, Lepani and
Morawetz 1985;41). One should bear in mind, however, that low mortality rates in Papua New Guinea
are partly a consequence of considerable efforts in this field from the prewar period and much
improved communication networks than in Irian Jaya.
CHAPTER 2
The Urban Economies
Outside the small number of enclave resource-based industries, the major centres
of economic change in Irian Jaya have been the small urban settlements and their
hinterlands. These have grown quite rapidly in recent years, particularly on the
north coast, supported by high levels of government expenditure, increasingly
intensive communications and trade and labour market integration with Java and
eastern Indonesia. Growth of the urban economies and investment in infrastruc
ture have in turn encouraged hinterland agricultural development, the latter
given considerable stimulus through the transmigration program and 'spontane
ous1 settlement of migrant farmers. The towns are now very similar in appearance
and economic structure to many other areas of Indonesia, sporting highly
competitive market trade and urban transport, and in the larger centres of
Jayapura and Sorong, major problems of overcrowding—urban slum dwelling,
pollution and pressure on scarce supplies of water and electricity. Nevertheless
they have several distinctive features: considerable dependence on government
spending; high cost structures with heavy reliance on goods and labour from
elsewhere in Indonesia; and continuing weak linkages with rural areas beyond
immediate hinterland areas and with other urban areas in the province. The
stranglehold over most private sector activities by migrants from eastern
Indonesia has become more pronounced, with attendant social conflict causing
increasing concern within provincial government circles.
Urban Economic Structure
A rough picture of urban economic structure can be gleaned from labour force
data. Service employment, predominantly in the government sector, was of far
greater significance than in most other regions of Indonesia in 1980; this sector
accounted for over 60 per cent of non-agricultural urban employment, compared
with close to 40 per cent in both Java and other outer island areas (Table 2.1). This
was matched by a much lower proportion of the urban work-force in trade (about
half or less of the proportion recorded in other provinces) and to a lesser extent in
manufacturing. The high percentage of government expenditure in the province is
reflected in the structure of the labour force in the towns of Irian Jaya.
The low proportion of total employment in trade and manufacturing, on the
other hand, was directly related to relatively low levels of production of
non-agricultural commodities in the towns. The urban population, and especially
migrants, continued to depend on imports from outside the province for almost all
commodities consumed on a day to day basis— rice, sugar, salt, a range of
vegetables (onions, garlic, potatoes and chillies), meat, textiles, canned food, beer
and a range of building materials. Major exceptions were fresh fish and green
vegetables, increasingly eggs (although in periods of peak demand these were still
brought in from Java) and timber. But in contrast to the early 1970s when a high
proportion of these products were imported from abroad, almost all consumer
goods, including canned foodstuffs and beer, were now supplied from elsewhere in
Indonesia, principally Surabaya and Ujung Pandang. Imports to Irian Jaya still
amount to about US$3-5 million a year in the mid 1980s, a figure much higher than
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the value of traditional exports, but these goods consisted almost entirely of
consumer products supplied to the Freeport mine and capital equipment brought
in by mining and oil companies.1 Increased volume of trade with other parts of
Indonesia has been supported by much more regular inter-island shipping—
approximately 8-10 ships arriving from Java via Ujung Pandang each month in
the mid 1980s.
Table 2.1 Distribution of employment by major non-agricultural sector, Irian Jaya and
selected outer island provinces, 1980
Selected outer island provinces
Irian
Jaya
Maluku East Central South All outer
Kali- Kali- Sulawesi islands
mantan mantan
All
Indonesia
Urban servicesb 61 53 36 36 42 43 41
Trade 12 18 22 25 29 27 27
Manufacturing 6 8 14 20 9 10 17
Transport 11 6 9 7 10 9 8
Construction 7 7 7 6 5 7 6
Other15 2 8 12 6 5 4 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N(000) 46 31 117 25 244 2361 8828
Rural servicesa 53 57 38 30 31 34 29
Trade 5 18 21 29 27 26 31
Manufacturing 17 10 22 25 27 22 24
Transport 2 6 9 5 7 6 5
Construction 17 8 6 6 7 8 8
Otherb 2 1 4 5 1 4 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N(000) 44 82 71 71 403 3914 13656
Non agriculture 15 22 29 21 30 24 33
Agriculture 85 78 79 70 76 67
flndudes banking and other financial services.
fining and public utilities.
Source: Biro Pusat Staustik, 1980 Population Census, Series 52, Jakarta, 1984: Tables 453, 45.6.
Despite these changes in the direction of trade and the improved transport, the
cost of living in Irian Jaya towns remains higher than elsewhere in Indonesia, to
some extent justifying special supplementary allowances to civil servants.
Department of Manpower data on basic physical minimum requirements (KFM)
covering food, clothing, housing and other basic needs, suggest prices in the major
northern port towns of Irian Jaya were about 20 per cent higher than in other high
cost, outer island provinces (East and Central Kalimantan and Maluku) and close to
30-40 per cent higher than in South Sulawesi and Java in 1985. Prices of several
basic commodities, most notably rice, salt, sugar and flour in the major towns are
closely monitored by the provincial government through the periodic setting of
standard prices (HPS—Harga Pedoman Setempat) not far above those prevailing
elsewhere in Indonesia. Imports and stock management by Regency Rice
Procurement Agency (DOLOG) ensures that market prices of basic commodities
1 In 1984 imports of consumer goods, mainly from Cairns in north Australia, to the Freeport mine
amounted to over US$3 million. In 1986 the company was prohibited from bringing in a range of
consumer goods from abroad.
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are only about 10-20 per cent above the HPS in the major towns. But the prices of
other commodities— consumer goods such as eggs, fresh meat, vegetables and
canned foodstuffs— are frequently more than double the prices prevailing in Java
and South Sulawesi (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Prices of beef, eggs and cement in selected towns in Irian Jaya, 1985
Selected urban centres Beef
(kg)
Eggs
(each)
Cement
(sack)
Jayapura
Nabire
5370 150
188
4,710
5,500
Merauke 3170 210 5,300
Wamena 190 17,500
Ujung Pandang 2810 67 3,560
Surabaya 3010 81 3,340
Kupang 2000 103 4,110
Source: Irian Jaya, Kantor Wilayah Perdagangan, Laporan Tahunan 1985, Jayapura, 1986.
The general cost of living index in Jayapura increased slightly less than in most
of the other 17 principal cities covered in the Indicator Ekonomi over the period
1977 to mid 1986, suggesting that integration of trade patterns within the rest of
Indonesia has marginally reduced the cost of living in urban Irian Jaya compared
with other regions, although it is noteworthy that food components of the index,
(especially staples, eggs, nuts and cooking oil) increased at a more rapid rate than
in most other cities in Indonesia.2 Unification of tariffs and import restrictions
with the rest of Indonesia in the early 1980s, however, produced relatively high
rates of inflation in Jayapura (and considerable disruption during the period of
transition) compared with other cities in Indonesia. 3
Several factors have contributed to the continuing high cost structure even in
the larger northern port cities of Jayapura and Sorong. Distance ensures that sea
and air transport costs are high from Java and South Sulawesi. The small volume
of consumption is a major obstacle to achievement of economies of scale in trade
and production necessary to reduce costs. Two major factors are relevant here.
Low levels of commercialization in rural areas limit the demand for imported and
locally produced goods, and this is exacerbated by the high cost and irregularity
of transport services between both towns and their hinterlands and isolated urban
centres. Despite a substantial increase in road mileage over the past decade and in
the number of commercial vehicles in operation near the major north coast towns,
transport costs between the larger urban centres and their hinterlands remain
high, ranging from Rp 10-30 per kilometre for passengers and a slightly lower
figure for a small consignment (10-20 kilograms) of goods in Jayapura and Sorong
in mid 1976. Introduction of special village transport vehicles in the Jayapura
region has facilitated the flow of agricultural produce to the towns, but marketing
margins of 30 to 50 per cent are not uncommon for vegetables sold in Hamadi
market in Jayapura. Increasing flows of products from new transmigration sites
^ The index, with the base year 1977-78, had risen to 245 in Jayapura by August 1986 compared with
an average of 260 for the 17 cities, 286 in Surabaya and 244 in Ujung Pandang. Reduction of subsidies
for major foodstuffs, most notably rice, probably explains the relatively rapid growth in the index for
basic foodstuffs.
3 See Biro Pusat Statistik, Bulletin Ringkas, August 1986. Rates of inflation during the period 1981-83
were dose to 15 per cent, nearly double those recorded for the 17 cities in the same period.
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have also contributed to an increase in the volume of trade and a lowering of
marketing margins, but a substantial decline in the latter is dependent on
increased allocation of funds for road maintenance, a problem shared by many
other outer island areas.
The cost of living in the majority of urban centres which are not directly linked
to the rest of Indonesia through inter-island shipping is very much higher than in
the major north coast towns. In 1985 the prices of basic commodities imported
from elsewhere in Indonesia — rice, soap, textiles, onions, eggs and
cement— were 10-50 per cent higher in Nabire on the north coast, and in
Merauke and Fak-Fak in the south, compared with Jayapura and Sorong. The
differentials were very much larger in the highlands, and in inland areas reached
only by river transport in the south; bulky materials such as cement and fuel were
sold at several times the prices prevailing in the major towns in the north. Cement
prices in Wamena in 1985 were close to Rp 20,000 per sack, four times those in
Jayapura and market prices of subsidized rice (Rp 600-700), 50 per cent more than
the price prevailing in the capital of the province.
Special government subsidized local shipping services (PERINTIS, Pelayaran
Perintis) provided by the national shipping line (PELNI) were introduced to Irian
Jaya in 1975 to provide isolated coastal settlements with a regular supply of basic
commodities. The number of ports served by small PERINTIS ships (150-750
deadweight tons DWT capacity) has increased from 26 to 77 since the mid 1970s,
with 5 boats on the north coast and 4 boats in the south in the mid 1980s. In
addition to subsidies of around Rp 500 million provided annually for the
operating costs of PERINTIS ships, the government introduced a special 50 per
cent subsidy for supply of 27 basic commodities transported to outlying urban
settlements and kecamatan posts in 1982.
The PERINTIS shipping service has improved the flow of basic commodities to
urban settlements but the impact has been much smaller than the number of ships
and ports visited might imply. Shipping services are irregular, especially in the
south, PERINTIS ships not always keeping to scheduled routes and calls often
being determined by the private gains accruing to the crew. Major problems of
inadequate docking facilities, shortages of fresh water and damage to ships have
also limited the impact of the program (Maman Suryana 1986a). The volume of
goods and persons transported by PERINTIS ships increased only marginally in
the 1980s in the north although it does appear to have increased more in southern
areas from a much smaller base. The low volume of return cargoes has
necessitated continuing high levels of subsidy to shipping services: Maman
Suryana (1986a) estimates a low figure of only about 5 per cent of existing
capacity of PERINTIS shipping utilized in 1985.
The special subsidy to goods delivered to outlying areas administered by the
Department of Trade had until 1985 been largely allocated to air transport of basic
commodities to the highlands at Wamena, with only a marginal impact on the
supply of goods and prices in coastal areas.4 In Wamena, however, the project
contributed to a considerable decline in prices of several basic commodities in
1983-84, subsidized prices of cement and salt being delivered at nearly half the
normal prices of these goods in the kabupaten market. The subsidy program
appears to have stimulated more regular air transportation— several daily flights
serving Wamena from Jayapura throughout the week in the mid 1980s—and
^e subsidy amounted to Rp 250,000 in 1982/83 rising to close to Rp 1 billion in 1984/85 and serving
all kabupaten and a projected number of 89 kecamatan throughout Irian Jaya (Indonesia, Departemen
Perdagangan 1984).
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encouraged both the flow of non-subsidized goods to Wamena and return trade
in vegetables supplied to Jayapura.5
Despite these improvements in road, sea and air communications, the urban
economies of Irian Jaya continue to remain poorly integrated. The relative surplus
of fresh vegetables— cabbages, chillies, tomatoes and onions— produced in the
highlands at Wamena fetched prices lower than half those prevailing in Jayapura in
1985-86. Natural constraints to trade help explain the highlands-lowland
differentials but on the coast poorly administered shipping services appear to be a
major obstacle to lowering the costs of public administration and the relative
shortage of basic commodities in small urban centres. Relative neglect of river
transport in the south near Merauke (in contrast to large public expenditures on
road transport) has been a major factor limiting the flow of goods to the indigenous
population in inland areas, with major river transport services continuing to be
supplied by small mission boats.
Urban Growth and Migrant Labour
As in most outer island areas, including Maluku and Sulawesi, the rate of urban
population growth has been high in Irian Jaya over the past 15 years. Migrant
labour mainly from South Sulawesi, Java and Maluku has contributed substantially
to the growth of new employment opportunities in most centres. Although
migrants from Java and South Sulawesi have also been an important component of
urban growth in some other outer island areas, most notably East Kalimantan and
to a lesser extent Maluku,6 competition for jobs between migrants and the local
population has been particularly marked in Irian Jaya. Weak rural-urban linkages
and the limited urban experience and skills in commercial activities of indigenous
people have been major obstacles to increased indigenous participation in the
urban economies. Increasingly intensive sea and air communication links with the
rest of Indonesia, rapid growth in urban labour demand and relatively high wages
and incomes earned in self-employed activities compared with those available in
eastern Indonesia and in Java have all encouraged the inflow of migrant labour.
The overall urban population growth rate was close to 5 per cent in the
intercensal period 1971-80, and has probably remained at this level or even
increased somewhat since then. The major north coast towns, most notably
Jayapura (including nearby Abepura) and Manokwari, have experienced the most
rapid growth in population (6.6 and 5.6 per cent per annum respectively over the
period 1971-80) in contrast to relatively low rates of urban growth in the more
isolated southern cities of Merauke and Fak-Fak (Table 2.3). The urban share of the
total population had risen to about 20 per cent in 1980, a little under one-third of
the urban population residing in the capital Jayapura-Abepura. The NUDS
(National Urban Development Strategy) study of urbanization in Indonesia
estimates on the basis of past growth rates that Jayapura-Abepura with a
relatively small population of 40,000 in 1971 will grow to a major city of about
200,000 by the end of this century.
Almost half the growth of the urban population in the intercensal period has
consisted of migrants, mainly from South Sulawesi. The share of non-Irian born in
the total urban population was still relatively small (about 30 per cent) in 1980,
but it has risen gradually since then to about 40 per cent in 1986, or a total of
5 Around 350 metric tonnes of vegetables were reported to have been transported from Wamena to
Jayapura in the first five months of 1984 with larger volumes being transported in the past few years.
In 1980, a high proportion of the urban population, 32 per cent in East Kalimantan and 20 per cent in
Maluku, were born outside the province; in both cases migrants were mainly from Java and Sulawesi.
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Table 2.3 Urban population growth rates in major cities, Irian Jaya, 1971-80
Population 1980 Per cent
N(OOO)
Per cent Annual
kabuftaten growth rate
population %
Per cent
of
increment
Jayapura/Aabepura
Sorong
Biak
Manokwari
Maaerauke
Other
All Irian Jaya
74.2
33.3
24.9
24.5
12.4
68.0
237.3
32
14
10
10
5
29
100
50
25
35
29
7
14
21a
6.6
42
3.8
5.6
13
4.7
5.0
39
12
8
11
3
27
100
Percentage of total Irian Jaya population.
Source: National Urban Development Strategy Final Report, NUDS, Table E.I, Census Penduduk 1980,
Series S No.28.
about 130,000 persons of an urban population of around 330,000 (Table 2.4 and
Annex Table 1). Based on past rates of growth non-Irian born would account for
just under half the Irian urban population in 1990; if account is taken of the
children born to migrants, the non indigenous population probably amount to
almost half the urban population in 1986 and may be closer to two-thirds by 1990.
Data on the net number of passengers arriving at various ports in Irian Jaya
provide a crude estimate of net migration to the province during the 1980s. The
data generally confirm the impression of an increasing number of arrivals from the
early 1980s, from around 3500 per annum in 1980-31 to 4500-5000 in 1983-84 and a
much higher figure of about 8500 in 1985, with the introduction of the Umsini
regular passenger liner service from Java through Eastern Indonesia to Sorong and
Jayapura. However, the figures, which also include travellers moving to and from
local ports, probably substantially underestimate the number of arrivals by sea.7 It
seems safe to conclude that annual net migration of around 4000-5000 persons in
the period 1971-80 (reflected in the census data on province of birth) had probably
doubled by the mid 1980s due to more regular and cheaper sea communications
with Java and eastern Indonesia. The number of migrants, especially from
Sulawesi, living in urban Irian Jaya in 1986 was probably smaller than some foreign
commentators have estimated8 but they were almost certainly substantial and
have significantly affected the pattern of urban economic activities. 9
Despite migration, daily wages were considerably higher in Irian Jaya
compared with Java and South Sulawesi in the mid 1980s, even after account is
taken of cost of living differences. Basic wages of sawmilling operators in Irian
Jaya, for example, were more than twice those recorded for Java and South
7 Data on net arrivals by the Umsini passenger liner to Jayapura suggest a monthly figure of about 470
since March 1985 implying an annual figure of over 5500 in 1985 by this ship alone; all net arrivals to
Jayapura by inter-island vessels were recorded at 7500 in 1985. Net arrivals by Umsini and a second
regular passenger liner Rinjani (operating from Java since April 1984) to the port of Sorong in 1985 also
amounted to about 5000 persons.
8 See for example Hastings (1983) and TAPOL (1983).
' It should be noted that figures mentioned in Table 2.3 are broadly consistent with Adicondro's
(1986a: 14-15) estimate of about 50,000-70,000 Sulawesi migrants in Irian Jaya in 1985/86, although net
migration from this region was probably higher than his estimate of 3000-4000 persons in the mid
1980s. Projections of relatively constant rates of increase in the number of migrants in urban areas
shown in Table 2.4 may slightly understate the importance of non-Irian born in the towns of Irian Jaya
in 1986, although the slowdown in growth in private and public investment from the mid 1980s
suggests that the above increases in net migration may not continue to the end of the decade.
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Table 2.4 Actual and estimated components of population, Irian Jaya, 1971-90
Urban 1971
Number '(000)
1980 1986 1990
Per cent
1971 1990
Urban population
Irian born 118 164 204 228 13 13
Non-Irian born:
Java 14 20 32 44 (43) (22)
Sulawesi 10 34 70 113 (29) (58)
Maluku 6 14 23 32 (18) (16)
Other 3 5 7 5 (10) (4)
Sub total 33 73 132 198 4 12
All urban 151 237 336 426 17 25
Rural population
Irian born 769 916 1040 1141 83 66
Transmigrants (1.0) 7 12 18 (60) (11)
Sub total 3 20 101 163 (0.3) 9
All rural 772 936 1141 1304 184 75
Urban and rural
Irian born 887 1080 1244 1369 96 79
Migrants 36 93 233 361 4 21
All Irian Jaya 923 1173 1477 1730 100 100
Notes:
1. The 1971 and 1980 data are taken from the 1971 and 1980 Censuses for total population in urban and
rural areas, the Irian-born and non-Irian born in urban areas, and from estimated number of
transmigrants living in rural areas based on transmigration data. The non-transmigrant migrant
population is rural and is an informed guess for 1971 and as a residual from data on number of
migrants living in rural areas minus estimated number of transmigrants in 1980 (1971 Census only
covered urban areas). The Irian-born rural population is calculated as a residual for 1971 and taken
from census data in 1980.
2. The 1986 and 1990 data are both projections based on assumptions concerning the rate of increase in
the number of migrants in urban areas and non-transmigrant migrants in rural areas according to past
trends, and the actual number of transmigrants moved over the period 1979-86 as a basis for
estimating trends to 1990.
See Annex Table 1 for assumed and derived growth rates for the period 1980-90.
Source: Sensus Penduduk 1971 and 1980; data provided by the Transmigration Office, 1986.
Sulawesi in 1984 and higher than in all other provinces with the exception of East
Kalimantan (Table 2.5). Estimated monthly incomes of wage labourers were
sufficient to cover living costs of a single worker (though not enough to meet the
estimated needs of a family) in Irian Jaya, but fell short of the requirements of
even a single worker in Central Java and South Sulawesi (see Table 2.5). In 1986
unskilled construction workers earned Rp 3000-3500 in Jayapura and drivers of
colt minibuses reported monthly earnings in the range of Rp 150,000-200,000 a
month, both several times the equivalent earnings in Java. Skilled workers in the
construction industry— carpenters and tradesmen— in Jayapura earned daily
wages of around Rp 7500-10,000.10
10 Data from National Social Economic Survey (SUSENAS) on the earnings of wage employees in
urban Indonesia in 1982 confirm a picture of relatively high wage incomes compared with other
Indonesian provinces except East Kalimantan. Irian Jaya and East Kalimantan recorded by far the
lowest proportion of low income workers (less than Rp 50,000 a month) and Irian Jaya easily the
highest proportion (35 per cent) of employees with incomes of Rp 100,000 or above, the latter
reflecting high civil service salaries in the province (Indonesia, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1985b: Table 7.1).
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Table 2.5 Wages of sawmill operators and minimum physical needs, selected provinces
of Indonesia, 1984
Province Wages
(Dec. 1984)
Minimum physical
needs
(Rp'000)b
Single Married
Monthly wage
as % of min.
physical needs
Single MarriedDaily Monthlya Index
Central Java
South Sula
1320
1370
33.0
34.3
1.0 35.8
40.7
76.2
86.8
92 43
39
wesi
1.04 84
Jakarta
Riau
1660
2240
41.5
56.0
13
17
39.5
50.1
89.8
96.1
105
111
46
58
Maluka 3070 76.8 23 52.0 107.9 148 71
Irian Jaya
East
3570 89.3 2.7 67.0 119.5 133 75
Kalimantan 3680 92.0 2.8 49.1 104.1 187 88
aAssumes 25 working days a month.
bAverage July-December 1984. Includes food, housing, clothing and other basic costs.
Source: Indonesia, Biro Pusat Statistik, Nilai Rata-Rata Kebutuhan Risik Minimum, 1978-1986, Jakarta,
1985; Indonesia, Biro Pusat Statistik, Upah Buruah Menurut Jenis Pekerjaan 1984, Jakarta, 1985
Wages were, however, much lower on government road construction projects
in inland areas and in the south. Low wages of Rp 1500, plus meals offered by the
government in rural construction projects, and of Rp 2000 in the nucleus estate oil
palm plantation near Jayapura, are one explanation for the difficulty in recruiting
indigenous unskilled labour although, as in Papua New Guinea, recruitment of
coastal people for wage labour activities has been a continuing problem in many
areas. This contrasts with a high demand for cash incomes sought through very
low wage labour jobs in the highlands; even at the lower Rp 1000 per day wages
offered on rural road construction in the Jayawijaya mountains, contractors faced
little difficulty in recruiting wage labour.11 In the south in Merauke unskilled
wages in construction were closer to Rp 2000, much lower than in the northern
towns due to the flow of seasonal workers from transmigration areas and the
relatively low level of commercial activity in the city.
The origins of a highly segmented employment structure in terms of ethnicity
can be seen from data on the sex and educational composition of urban residents
according to province of birth published in the 1971 Census.12 The 1971 urban
population, both the migrant population and the Irian born, was heavily weighted
in favour of males, and the employment structure even more so with only slightly
over 10 per cent of all employed persons in urban areas being females." The
dominant migrant group in Irian Jaya were Javanese, a high proportion of whom
consisted of civil servants and military personnel. Nearly half of all male senior
high school graduates and the large majority of tertiary educated males in the
province in 1971 were born in Java, double the number of male Irian-born senior
high school graduates, and ten times the small number of 92 Irianese tertiary
Contractors often made substantial gains from low wages, with formal wage levels specified in
contracts frequently around Rp 3000-500.
12 See Sensus Penduduk 1971, Series E No.26, Table 23. Unfortunately similar tabulations were not
available from the 1980 Census.
13 Urban sex ratios for the population aged 10 and over in 1971 were 163, 155 and 176 for the total
urban population Irian born and non-Irian born respectively.
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educated males recorded in urban areas in that year. Other senior high school
graduates born outside the province, also predominantly employed in the civil
service, came largely from Maluku—mainly Ambonese and Kei graduates
employed by the Dutch after the war—and Sumatra, the latter mainly from
North Sumatra.
Whereas nearly half of all Javanese in the province—and probably a
considerably higher proportion of employed Javanese— had graduated from
senior high or tertiary institutions in 1971, a relatively small proportion (just over
10 per cent) of those born in South Sulawesi had similar educational
qualifications, the large majority being primary educated or less. Together with
relatively uneducated Irianese, almost half of whom had not graduated from
primary school, these made up the bulk of the unskilled labour force in the towns
of Irian Jaya. But while Irianese were strongly represented in unskilled
occupations in the civil service, the South Sulawesi migrants were largely
employed in wage labour activities in the private sector and in trade.
Private sector employment
Data on duration of residence of migrants in Irian Jaya in 1971 confirm the
picture of Javanese moving to the province from 1963 to fill government positions.
But migration from South Sulawesi has been more recent; the large majority of
Bugis, Macassarese and Butonese from south and southeast Sulawesi entered
Irian Jaya after the 'quarantine1 was lifted on spontaneous migration to the
province following the Act of Free Choice in 1969. George Adicondro's (1986a)
fascinating account of migration of a wide range of groups from Sulawesi to Irian
Jaya describes the wide range of occupations into which these migrants have
moved, again fragmented according to area of origin. Butonese and Torajanese
were prominent in the early years, moving into fishing and timber exploitation on
the outskirts of major cities, in particular Jayapura. This was followed by large
numbers of Buginese traders and urban self-employed and poorer Macasserese in
a wide range of low income self employed jobs. In the wake of the construction
boom stimulated by the transmigration and associated road building projects,
many Butonese and Macassarese have entered wage work in construction
projects, and Butonese obtained land for market gardening on the fringe areas of
Jayapura. Several large, mainly Buginese business firms (outstanding amongst
these the Benteng Mas group) have emerged in recent years, some of them
starting from humble beginnings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Adicondro
(1986a: 19b) mentions 10 such firms engaged mainly in construction and trade,
providing strong competition for more established Chinese businesses, all with
total assets of over 1 billion rupiah (about US$1 million) in late 1985. Similarly
several Torajanese timber enterprises have blossomed into large companies
supplying sawn timber and furniture to the government, private business and
private consumers.
Migrants from South Sulawesi have spread widely in urban areas in Irian Jaya
—most intensively in the north, but also including employment in logging and
sawmilling, and establishment of market stalls in the highlands at Wamena and
similar activities in Merauke in the south. But their impact on the enclave urban
economies and their hinterlands has differed in intensity, and tensions with the
local population also have varied from location to location. Whereas their
presence is dominant in almost all areas of non-Chinese private sector activity in
Jayapura and conflicts with local population are common, indigenous fishermen
and wage labourers (especially in the port of Sorong) appear to be much more
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prominent in several other regions. Moluccans and migrants from east Nusa
Tenggara play a major role in transport in Sorong and seem to be better integrated
with the local population than the Bugis-Makassarese (Kabar Dari Kampung 4 (20),
April 1986: 24-5). In the highlands town of Wamena almost all the vegetables and
fish sold in the market place are sold by the indigenous Dhani population, and
both Javanese and indigenes seem to participate more actively in market trade in
Merauke than in Jayapura. A few, relatively small-scale Irianese building
contractors now compete with migrants for government contracts in most urban
areas, including Wamena, and small Irianese workshops in radio and motor cycle
repair activities are common.
Migration, especially from South Sulawesi, has stimulated employment of
Irianese in some areas. Adicondro (1986a) notes adherence by the large Benteng
Mas company to the provincial government's exhortation that local firms employ
a minimum of 50 per cent indigenous workers in their company; several logging
companies in the highlands employ local labour, and small indigenous
contractors are involved in construction projects in several regions including near
Wamena in the highlands. Tuna and prawn fishing companies operating off
Sorong and Biak employ several hundred Irianese. Although the hopes that the
Joint Development Fund (JDF) set up under the FUNDWI program might make a
major contribution to the development of indigenous skills and entrepreneurship
have not been realized, this organization has stimulated small amounts of Irianese
employment in shipbuilding, batik work (using traditional Irian designs) and
urban transport. 14
The overall effect of the influx of migrant unskilled and skilled labour has,
nevertheless, been severely to limit opportunities for employment of Irianese in
private sector activities. Contractors prefer to employ what they regard as more
reliable, harder working migrant labour. Many Irianese are reported to work
short periods for target incomes and remain tied to traditional agricultural
patterns, returning to their villages after short periods of wage employment. The
close social organization of migrant groups, facilitating extension of marketing
links and distribution of capital from the larger traders to newcomers, makes
entry of less experienced Irianese extremely difficult in market trade. Complaints
of unfair trade practices by local sellers of primary products, especially playing on
the Irianese lack of bargaining skills, relative lack of accurate price information
and price-quality relationships, remain a familiar theme in the area of retail trade
(Garnaut and Manning 1974; Adicondro 1986a). Higher technology employed by
migrant fishermen and the continued use of dynamite in fishing in some areas,
despite government bans, remain a major obstacle to Irianese attempts to
maintain their share in the marketing of this important consumer good in urban
areas.
Adicondro (1986a) also notes a range of practices adopted by migrants to
obtain control of land for market gardening close to the towns: temporary
marriage with local villagers, and playing on the weakness for alcohol among
some indigenous groups and tribal leaders to obtain land leases being most
prominent. He also reports the involvement of government officials (Irianese and
non-Irianese), and larger migrant and Chinese businessmen in land acquisition
schemes as contributing to the alienation of traditional land control among
Irianese groups living close to the cities.
14 The JDF credit programs in urban areas in particular have also been directed at non-Irianese,
especially in public transport, and the major JDF contribution to indigenous skills and enterprise
made in fisheries, animal husbandry and plantations in rural areas.
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The government has become increasingly alarmed and senior officials more
outspoken about the conflicts between migrants and the indigenous population,
especially those living in the vicinity of Jayapura. The problem has been brought
to public notice through repeated outbreaks of violence, especially a major conflict
which claimed several Irianese and migrant lives just prior to the border crossings
in 1984. Reports of incidents and conflicts of interest between migrants and
Irianese have also been more widely publicized than in the past through
investigative reports published by the independent Irian Jaya Rural Community
Development Foundation (of which the study by Adicondro is an outstanding
example), both published independently and summarized in the highly
informative Kabar Dari Kampung magazine 1S
Systematic attempts to address the problems, most of which were quite
apparent in the early 1970s, are yet to be canvassed. Some innovative approaches
have been tried in recent years, such as the present Governor's policy of
subcontracting small-scale construction projects to indigenous entrepreneurs in
the Jayapura region. But government policies, especially the opening of regular
passenger liner services from Java to Sorong and Jayapura in 1984-85, have
generally encouraged migrant participation in urban economies. Restrictions on
migration would be extremely difficult to enforce and, in any case, run counter to
a fundamental central government commitment to interregional labour mobility
throughout the archipelago.16 One observer (Koentjaraningrat 1984b) has suggest
ed that major efforts should be made to train Irianese in semi-skilled and skilled
jobs in urban areas (carpentry, mechanical work, welding, electrical work and the
like), accepting the reality that trade and unskilled labour will continue to be
dominated by migrant labour in the immediate future. Such a program may
contribute to Irianese participation in the economy, although the experience of the
vocational training centre in Jayapura suggests close cooperation between private
sector firms and training institutes is essential if trained personnel are to be
utilized effectively. But unless positive employment discrimination policies in
favour of the indigenous population are pursued with greater consistency and
political commitment than in the past, giving a much greater supervisory role to
the seemingly weak local manpower office (and possibly supported by fiscal
policies which encourage the employment of indigenous labour), continued social
conflict arising from the inability of the local population to compete with migrants
would appear to be unavoidable.
Public sector employment
Given the overwhelming importance of the public sector as a source of
employment, especially of educated manpower, in the urban economies,
government policies with respect to employment in the public sector are of critical
importance to Irianese participation in wage labour in the towns of Irian Jaya.
Approximately 30,000 civil servants were employed in the province in 1980,
including 9000 officials on the payroll of central government departments,
accounting for over 80 per cent of all wage workers in services and over 60 per
cent of all wage employees in the province. The number of officials employed by
the provincial government had almost doubled by the mid 1980s and included
just over 18,000 employees on secondment from the central government. National
15 Adicondro's (1986a) report caused upset among some migrant leaders in Irian Jaya in mid 1986 and
led to a temporary ban being placed on Kabar Dari Kampung.
16 Senior officials are aware, moreover, that anattempt to control the number of migrants would be
extremely difficult to enforce.
THE URBAN ECONOMIES 29
Social Economic Survey (SUSENAS) data for 1982 suggest that Irian Jaya had by
far the highest proportion of wage labour households (76 per cent) reporting
government employment in urban areas as the major source of household income
of any province in Indonesia, and together with Maluku by far the lowest
proportion (less than 30 per cent) of informal sector workers among urban
employees. Over half of all wage employees in urban Irian Jaya were clerical (38
per cent) and professional workers (15 per cent), the latter mainly teachers. 17
The educational composition of the urban labour force changed significantly
during the 1970s with a doubling of the number of senior high school and tertiary
graduates, the large majority of these (including about 80 per cent of tertiary
graduates) employed in services, predominantly on the government payroll. 18 It
seems likely that about half of the increment in this relatively well educated
labour force were Irian-born placing increasing pressure on the government as the
major employer to find jobs for locally educated people. 19
No official data are available on the proportion of Irianese working in
government offices, but as in the private sector, competition with migrants has
been a major issue of controversy within the province. The initial justification for
employment of outsiders, the shortage of educated and experienced personnel, is
becoming less relevant as Irianese graduates from the University of
Cenderawasih, from other educational institutions in Indonesia and from abroad
come into the labour market. Attracted by high salaries, many middle level civil
servants from Java, North Sumatra and Maluku appointed in the late 1960s and
early 1970s have elected to remain in Irian Jaya, limiting opportunities available to
new Irianese graduates. The problem is exacerbated by the second generation of
educated migrants (and the children and relatives of non-Irian born civil servants
who have taken up a significant proportion of places in educational institutions)
beginning to seek jobs in Irian Jaya's major cities in recent years. Migrants have
continued to retain a substantial share of senior positions within the civil service,
especially as representatives of central government departments and key
administrators, the bupati (regent) and the senior staff in the provincial and
kabupaten administration.20 Only four of the nine bupatis were Irian-born in mid
1986. One should note, however, that participation of tertiary educated Irianese in
the modern sector has also been hampered by the failure of many bright sarjana to
return to the province after graduating in Java, and a marked preference of
Irianese to seek secure government positions rather than look for openings in the
private sector or less stable employment with non government organizations.21
Unskilled occupations within the civil service have since Dutch times been the
17 The survey was only conducted in the north coast regions of Jayapura (including Abepura and
Sentani) and Biak and probably overstates the importance of public sector employment in the
province as a whole (see Indonesia, Biro Pusat Statistik, Keadaan Upah Buruh/Pekerja di Setiap Propinsi di
Indonesia 1982 Jakarta 1985; Tables 5.3, 9.1; Pekerja Sector Informal, Jakarta 1985b: Table 6.2.3).
This includes graduates recorded as rural residents in the 1980 census mainly living in housing
complexes on the outskirts of Jayapura.
' Unfortunately no data are available from the 1980 census on the educational status of the urban
population by province of birth.
Although very recently some attempt has been made to move Irianese into key positions in the
bureaucracy, Mulyarto (1985: 19) notes, for example, that only 2 of the 38 senior representatives of
central government departments were Irianese at a meeting he attended organized by the
transmigration office. A similar impression was gained by the authors during visits to various
government offices in August-September 1986 in Jayapura, Wamena, Sorong and Merauke.
21 One informant suggested that only quite recently have young tertiary educated Irianese begun to
take up posts in a wide range of non-government organizations operating in Irian Jaya,
30 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRIAN JAYA
major source of wage income for Irianese. Rumbiak (1978) for example, notes the
overwhelming importance of public service employment for relatively
uneducated Irianese migrants from Genyem, about 100 kilometres from the
capital. But here too Irianese appear to be increasingly facing competition from
migrants. Koneksi (connections, usually family relationships) with existing
employees has been a major channel for entry into the civil service, family
members often travelling from Java to apply for jobs. Despite provincial
government attempts to encourage the employment of Irianese in the civil service,
the predominance of informal channels of recruitment remain a major obstacle to
implementation of this policy. In addition, the higher quality of secondary
educational institutions in Java has been suggested by one informant as a factor
giving migrant labour the edge in civil service tests given to new job applicants.
Substantial constraints to expansion of wage employment of Irianese in urban
areas do not, however, appear to have contributed to high levels of
unemployment in urban areas. Recorded open unemployment levels in urban
Irian Jaya (3 per cent according to the 1980 census and a higher 7 per cent
recorded in SUSENAS 1982) were not significantly higher than in other
Indonesian provinces, showing the familiar pattern of higher rates among
females, young job applicants and the secondary educated. Major physical
constraints to rural-urban migration and continued involvement of temporary
urban workers in agricultural activities within the vicinity of towns has probably
substantially reduced the volume of semi-permanent migrants seeking work in
the cities — a situation which contrasts with conditions prevailing in several
major towns in Papua New Guinea. Migrant labour has, moreover, kept urban
wages relatively low, although the provincial minimum wage (Rp 1600-2500 in
various sectors) for unskilled labour appears to be well below actual wages
prevailing in most firms.
To conclude, two major problems are associated with the pattern of urban
employment described in this section. The first is the continuing weakness of
linkages between urban centres and rural areas. Relatively limited opportunities
for employment expansion for unskilled local labour in the towns constitute an
obstacle to the remittance of cash incomes back to villages, a flow which has been
a major stimulant to rural development and cash cropping in neighbouring Papua
New Guinea. Second, expansion of education at a secondary and increasingly a
tertiary level has not been matched by commensurate growth in opportunities for
educated indigenous labour to participate in the urban economies. In part this
reflects the tiny contribution to total employment growth of new investment in
manufacturing of consumer goods and processing of natural resources. In part it
is related to the continued prominent role of migrant labour in employment at
senior and middle levels of the civil service, and increasingly also in unskilled
government jobs. It seems clear that growth in indigenous participation in the
urban economies will be achieved only through explicit, coordinated policies to
raise the skills of Irianese and reserve a certain proportion of new jobs for them.
Failure to follow such policies can only increase the already apparent signs of
dissatisfaction among the educated and urban Irianese, a problem likely to grow
as schooling opportunities spread more widely throughout the province.
CHAPTERS
Resource-based Industries
The 1970s and early 1980s saw a flurry of large investments in resource-based
activities in Irian Jaya in the areas of oil, mining, fisheries and forestry, accounting
for almost all the increase in the value of provincial exports (see Table 1.2). But the
impact of these activities on the regional economy has been small, with virtually
no major processing facilities established in the province. Lack of close central and
provincial government supervision of projects and of determined attempts to
maximize regional economic gains through integration with the economic
activities of the local population has contributed to the disappointing flow of
benefits, and several important backwash effects on local populations.
Sorong has been the centre of resource-based investment and exports with all
oil exploitation and foreign investments in prawn fishing being concentrated in
this region, which accounted for well over 90 per cent of total regional exports in
the mid 1980s. Oil exploration in the region contributed to significant
employment creation from the mid 1970s to early 1980s, providing short-term
contract work for several thousand workers at various times throughout the
period. Together with the operations of the prawn fishing firms based in Sorong
and a tuna fishing company (PT Usaha Mina) owned by the Fisheries Department
all of which had begun operations by the mid 1970s, hopes of substantial growth
in employment based on natural resource industries contributed to an inflow of
job seekers to the town from eastern Indonesia and Java. These hopes have not
been realized, however. There has been little new investment in exploitation of
fish reserves in the past decade, nor any addition to processing facilities beyond a
cold storage plant established for export of tuna and prawns. The decline in oil
exploration activities associated with the fall in oil prices, and static employment
in fish based industries have contributed to problems of youth unemployment in
the town in the mid 1980s. Plans to establish a tuna canning factory at Sorong,
similar to that already under construction by the French joint venture operation in
tuna fishing centred on Biak, appear to be the only prospect for new job creation
in the immediate future.1 But the feasibility of the canning factory remains in
doubt with current exports of around 3000 tonnes per annum far short of the
required volume of 10,000 tonnes for economic operation of a canning factory.
One objective of the tuna fishing operations by PT Usaha Mina has been to
enourage local fishermen by the provision of equipment and guaranteeing the
purchase of the tuna catch. The company reported in mid 1986 that 20 fishermen
were supplying tuna to PT Usaha Mina, but the volume of the catch was still a
small proportion of total exports and has largely involved migrants from Maluku
and South Sulawesi.
One backwash effect of the presence of PT Usaha Mina and the prawning
enterprises in Sorong has occurred through the sale of the side catch on the
Sorong market, depressing fish prices and discouraging the operations of local
1 The company also has hopes to establish brackish pond (tambak) cultivation of shrimps but this
operation is still in the early stages of planning. It should also be noted that the Joint Development
Fund has begun the planning of a fishing port at Deppre on the north coast west of Jayapura for tuna
fishing operations which it supported in 1987.
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fishermen. In the case of FT Usaha Mina the problem has been exacerbated by low
salaries paid to crews employed on its boats, encouraging them to seek additional
incomes through sales of fish in the local market (Mambraku et al., 1984).
Despite considerable exploration for oil and other mineral resources on
concession areas throughout the province, the Petromer Trend exploitation of oil
in a series of onshore wells close to Sorong and the Freeport copper mine at
Mount Ertzberg in the south remain the only large mineral projects established in
Irian Jaya in the past decade. Low world prices of most minerals, high
exploitation costs, combined with security threats in some areas, have been the
major factors discouraging new investment. The Pacific Nickel mining project on
Gag Island off Sorong, with very large investments in processing facilities and
port and infrastructure development, was abandoned in the late 1970s due to the
slump in nickel prices; security threats to the Mamberamo Shell investment in oil
exploitation in the Sarmi-Mamberamo region off the north coast were the
ostensible reasons for withdrawal of the company in 1985, although low oil prices
clearly contributed to the company's decision to discontinue operations.
The Freeport copper project was well established when copper prices slumped
in the mid 1970s and operations were extended to underground mining in
1981-82, encouraged by improved copper prices at the end of the 1970s. The new
underground resource is several times the size of the already exploited open cut
copper deposits. Mining has also been made more profitable by discovery of
considerable deposits of silver and gold (Tempo 7 June 1980). The mine now
supports the large town of Tembagapura, with a population of around 4000 and a
total work-force of over 2000 in the mid 1980s, the large majority of employees
now being Indonesian, with a small foreign work-force of close to 300 employees
(Kompas 17 January 1981). Quite a high proportion of Indonesian employees,
including almost all the managerial and highly skilled personnel, come from
outside Irian Jaya, but the company also employs several hundred local unskilled
employees on a temporary basis as well as both skilled and unskilled labour
recruited especially from the northern island of Biak.2 As with other mining
projects, wages of the permanent employees are relatively high by local standards
(starting rates in 1986 were Rp 75,000 per month for unskilled labour, provided
with free board and lodging), and their impact through remittances is visible in
the string of brick houses established by employees on the outskirts of Biak.
Relations with the local population have not been good over the years,
however, and positive spread effects on incomes of the local population relatively
slight. Although the company has been active in providing health care and
nutritional assistance to local villagers, after nearly 15 years of operation,
foodstuffs, especially for foreign employees, continue to be imported from abroad
or elsewhere in Indonesia. Only after serious threats to the project through
sabotage in 1977 and pressure from Jakarta did the company begin to purchase
vegetables from the local population. Labour relations have been strained, as a
consequence of large wage differentials between foreign and Indonesian
permanent staff, the continuing temporary status of locally recruited workers and
the failure to provide fringe benefits (especially housing) made available to
permanent staff (Adicondro 1982; Kompas 17 January 1981).
Investors did not begin to turn their attention to forestry in Irian Jaya until the
late 1970s, as some of the richer and more accessible forest reserves in Kalimantan
2 See especially Adicondro (1982) and Wilson (1981) for accounts of the impact of the project in the
early 1980s.
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and Sumatra were depleted, and logging operations in several of these locations
were increasingly contracted. The boom in log exports in Irian Jaya has been a
short one. The value of exports rose to close to US$30 million in 1979-81 (about
2-3 per cent of national log exports in these years), but then fell substantially,
following the imposition of export quotas and stopped abruptly with the
imposition of a total ban on log exports in January 1985. As in other outer island
provinces, the total area of production of around 7 million hectares of forest had
been divided up among a large number of potential domestic and foreign
investors, but only a small number of these (including two joint venture firms)
had actually begun production when the ban on log exports was introduced in
1985.3
Contracts obliged all investors to establish local processing facilities, most of
them stipulating establishment of sawmills. But in 1986 only three of the six
investors remaining in production had actually done so (all of these sawmills
close to urban centres), with three others from the large Jakarta-based Djajanti
group processing timber in plywood plants in Maluku. The casualties included a
large Korean-financed joint venture operation based at Dempta on the north coast
about one hundred kilometres from Jayapura. Its contract included the
establishment of a plywood factory but the company withdrew in early 1986
ostensibly for security reasons (it had received repeated threats from The Free
Papua Movement (OPM, Operasi Papua Merdeka) guerrillas). It seems more likely
that the company, like the large majority of smaller investors, never intended to
establish a plywood factory in Irian Jaya and shut down once the lucrative log
export trade was banned (Kabar Dari Kampung 4 (21), June 1986: 10-13).
Irian Jaya indeed seems to have been fortunate that investors turned to this
province rather late and the regional economy will have lost little from the ban on
log exports. Although we are not in a position to generalize about the impact of
logging, all indications suggest the benefits to the local population have been
small and the destructive effects of uncontrolled logging on the environment, and
traditional social economic patterns of life, have been substantial. The effects
appear to have been worst in the south, especially in the Asmat region, where
logging has been subcontracted by the concession holders to middlemen who
(with the support of local government officials and the military) have in turn
directed the indigenous population to undertake logging on a contract basis.4 The
initial payments to the local population of Rp 3500 per cubic metre, together with
the provision of simple logging equipment (machetes, axes and the like) and
tobacco, amounting to around 5-10 per cent of free on board (fob) price of exports
from Agats, caused such a stir that the Bupati was forced to intervene to raise the
contract fee, and ban the role of middlemen and government officials in the trade.5
Taking into account deductions for equipment and tobacco supplied, local
estimates of incomes earned from up to a month's work in the jungle were around
Rp 10,000-15,000, well below the minimum wages prevailing in the province at
that time. Maintenance of this basic contract system of exploitation has continued,
3 In 1984 a total of 53 companies had been granted concession areas with a total of 22 companies being
granted forest exploitation rights (HPH) by the Forestry Department to proceed with logging. A total
of about 16 companies (official figures are inconsistent regarding the exact number) had actually been
involved in production by 1985.
* These practices were widely exposed in Indonesia and caused something of a public outcry
following a series of articles published in Kompas in early October 1982 (4-9 October). A follow-up
study was conducted in 1984 by Adicondro, Rumbiak and Mandibondibo (1985) on the impact of
logging operations on local welfare.
The new contract fee was, however, only raised to Rp 4500.
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with concession holders taking no responsibility for the welfare of employees, the
effects of overcutting or for replanting. The forced consignments of timber
delivered to some local officials for personal gain will be to some extent removed
by the ban on exports of logs and closer supervision by kabupaten officers. But the
continuation of logging in this region for shipment to plywood factories in
Maluku ensures little improvement is likely to take place within the present
system of exploitation in the Asmat region.
Adicondro, Rumbiak and Mandibondibo (1985) provide a detailed account of
the detrimental effect of logging on the social and economic life of villages in the
region. Males are attracted to logging chiefly for the tobacco supplied by the
companies and their agents, and their long periods of absence in the jungle
disadvantages the schooling of children, village cooperative activities and any
attempt by local officials and missions to introduce new more viable economic
activities in the villages.6
On the north coast, wage labour appears to have been much more prevalent in
most areas, with investors directly involved in the supervision of logging
operations. Roads constructed by the logging companies have also brought some
benefits to the local population. But problems of reafforestation and lack of
selective cutting familiar elsewhere in Indonesia remain a problem, perhaps more
severe than in other provinces because of obstacles to intensive supervision posed
by poor communications networks. Various reports suggest that benefits from the
special cess ($4 per m3) levied on all log exports in Indonesia, and designed to pay
for reafforestation, have been minimal in most areas.7 The problem of threats to
indigenous hunting, fishing and agricultural practices by logging operations in
the concession areas and inadequate environmental evaluation of the impact of
new roads and infrastructure seems also to be a general one in most logging
areas.8
In sum, the hope that resource-based industries might play a major role in
stimulating employment and generating indigenous incomes in Irian Jaya have
been realized to only a small extent, with conflicts of interest between new
investors and economic activities of the local population often running counter to
gains from the new activities. In part this is related to de facto /ack of provincial
government control of new investors several of whom have powerful backing in
Jakarta.
It also derives from problems of supervision in remote locations and a
tendency for some companies and local officials to exploit the simple economic
aspirations of local peoples or, alternatively, to ignore some of the fundamental
work and resource use patterns on which traditional economic activities depend.
Considerable disenchantment with the mode of operations of new companies and
lack of benefits flowing to villagers affected by them has undoubtedly encouraged
6 Several timber cooperatives had thrived in the 1960s and early 1970s in various villages in the region
under missionary guidance, but most had disappeared by the late 1970s primarily as a consequence of
poor management and irregular work patterns of many of the local people. Attempts to resuscitate
these appear to have been impeded by involvement of male labour in logging activities for private
investors.
7 In addition to the references mentioned above see also Kabar Dari Kampung 1 (2), (English Edition),
1984.
8 See various editions of Kabar Dari Kampung for examples and especially the discussion of the impact
of the Ypu Lim Sari's operations in the Dempta region (Korwa 1985). One extraordinary facet of the
latter project was the government's approval of the company using a local secondary school building
and church for its offices in the town of Dempta.
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sabotage and sporadic armed resistance to intruders both from local tribesmen
and OPM guerrillas. Experience of the past 15 years would suggest that some
fundamental changes are required in the planning and execution of new projects
by government officials at all levels, and also by many private companies, if
increasing tensions with the local population are to be avoided.
CHAPTER 4
Rural Economic Change
As noted in Chapter 1, production in most rural areas in Irian Jaya continues to be
largely subsistence oriented, with trade restricted to traditional barter or
incidental sales of produce from agriculture, hunting and fishing to meet demand
for a limited number of consumption items. Although macro data on employment
by primary sector of activity are a poor guide to the diversity of economic
pursuits in rural areas,1 they do suggest that the structure of rural employment in
Irian Jaya differs quite markedly from most other outer island provinces of
Indonesia2. In 1980, for example, only 15 per cent of the rural work-force were
involved in non-agricultural employment as a primary activity, in contrast to a
much higher 20-30 per cent in most other outer island provinces, and this
represented a smaller absolute number of persons than the number of
non-agricultural workers in urban Irian Jaya (see Table Al). Over half of all
non-agricultural workers were employed in service activities, mainly as teachers
and government officials, and only a fraction gave trade (5 per cent) or transport
(2 per cent) as their major sector of employment, in contrast to a much higher
proportion — especially of trade employees (averaging 26 per cent for all outer
island provinces) in other provinces.
By far the most intensive areas of rural economic change in recent years have
been in the urban hinterland regions, supported by new transmigration
settlements and improvements in land communication links with the rapidly
growing towns chiefly on the north coast. As noted above, food crop production
has been the major emphasis in government programs centred in these regions
with less intensive and less successful programs of tree crop development and
encouragement of traditional fishing activities playing a subsidiary role.
Food Crops
The most important development in terms of production has been the growth in
partially irrigated and rain-fed sawah rice production from less than 1000 tonnes
per annum in 1974 to an estimated (but probably overstated) 20,000 tonnes of dry
unmilled gabah in 1984 (Table 4.1). Production in 1984 probably amounted to
around 10-15 per cent of Irian Jaya's estimated need of around 60-70,000 tonnes
of milled rice in the mid 1980s. Most of this growth in production has been a
consequence of extension of land areas in the transmigration projects in the
Merauke, Jayapura and Manokwari regions (Table 4.2), although more recently
increased yields at some of the older transmigration sites have also played a role.
In all the new rice growing areas, yields have been highly dependent on supplies
of inorganic fertilizer and pesticides. Given the high cost of delivery of these
inputs to the farmer, and high transportation costs of surpluses from major
producing areas to nearby towns, and beyond these to other urban settlements,
1 See Garnaut and Manning (1974: Chapter 9) for a detailed account of agricultural diversity in Irian
Jaya.
2 This applies especially in a province where most households market their own products and are
often involved in non-agricultural activities in slack periods of activity in agriculture.
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the wisdom of basing transmigration agricultural efforts on rice as the major crop
in most areas must be open to considerable doubt.3
Table 4.1 Estimated production of major foodstuffs in Irian Jaya, 1974, 1980 and 1984
('000 tons)
Production ('000 tons) 1984
1974 1980 1984 Area ('000 ha) Productivity
Rice:
sawah 0.9 33 21.4 62 3.4
ladang 03 0.8 4.2 22 2LO
Corn 2.6 2.0 2.8 3.4 0.8
Cassava 26.3 26.0 35.8 53 6.8
Sweet potatoes 314.0 332.0 333.0 47.3 7.0
Peanuts 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 0.6
Mung beans 0.2 1.3a .. -
Soya beans 0.4 1.8 2.4 18 OS
(Vegetables) 4.1 12.7 17.8 5.9 3.0
(Fruit) 13.9 19.2 6.1 1.4
Total 85.1
a1981.
Note: These figures are very rough estimates. As with other series, different sources report widely
different figures on production and area cultivated. Productivity data especially for rice are likely to be
significantly overstated and subject to large annual fluctuations.
Sources: Irian Jaya, Kan tor Statist! k Tingkat 1, Irian Jaya Dalam Angka, Jayapura, 1984; Irian Jaya, Dinas
Pertanian, laporan Tahunan 1984, Jayapura, 1985.
Increases in production of other food crops have been much smaller and, as
with rice, concentrated in the northern kabupaten adjacent to major towns. Corn,
peanuts, soya bean and mung bean production has varied considerably from
year to year according to climatic conditions and is barely keeping up with the
estimated growth in urban demand. Near Jayapura, vegetables and fruit have
been supplied by Butonese market gardeners acquiring land from the local
population, in addition to production flowing from the transmigration
settlements. In some locations Irianese farmers have also been involved in
market gardening, even in padi production (both sawah and dryland cultivation)
outside the transmigration settlements in the south (Kabar Dari Kampung 3(18),
December 1985: 49-52), but most marketed food crops have been produced by
migrants.
Other major staples — sweet potatoes and sago— consumed by the majority
of the local population have received little attention in government programs
and very small amounts find their way to local markets for sale to wage
employees. There have been periodic reports of localized famine, especially in
the agriculturally poor and relatively isolated kecamatan of Kurima in the
Jayawijaya highlands in 1982 and more recently in late 1986 and early 1987. In
1982 a prolonged drought in Kurima was estimated to have claimed 46 lives
(although estimates of the actual number of deaths varied widely) and the more
See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discusssion of rice production in the transmigration areas.
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recent drought anything from 50-170 lives according to various Indonesian and
foreign press reports.4
The extent and causes of the late 1986 famine are a matter of conjecture. One
observer, basing his conclusions on interviews with mission representatives and
reporters who visited the affected region, has suggested that 'politics of the
stomach', the tendency for local officials (including the Kurima region camat from
Biak on the north coast) to overstate the extent of deprivation in order to obtain
extra rice for the Christmas and New Year celebrations, and similar exaggerated
reports by local health workers to gain additional consignments of much needed
medical supplies, both contributed to rather wild reports of the extent of the
famine (Adicondro 1987).5
Failure of the pandana harvest and neglect of staple, sweet potato gardens
resulting from both inattention to the pandana crop and wage labour activities on
government sponsored INPRES road construction projects, a much sought after
source of cash income for many highlanders, have both been mentioned as
factors contributing to food shortages. But it seems that the fragility of the
Table 4.2 Distribution of area planted to various food crops, Irian Java, 1984
Kubupaten Rice Corn Cassava Sweet
potatoes
Soya
beans
Peanuts
North coast
Jayapura 21 17 7 1 35 23
Biak . 2 25 2 1 1
Sorong 7 27 23 2 9 23
Manokwari 18 18 15 1 45 26
Yapen-Waropen - - 7 - - 1
Total 46 64 77 6 90 74
South coast
Merauke 46 4 5 . 2 9
Fak-Fak . 12 13 1 . 10
Total 46 16 18 1 2 19
Highlands
Jayawijaya - 10 4 43 2 2
Paniai 7 10 1 48 6 5
Total 7 20 5 93 8 7
99 100 100 100 100 100
Total area 8.3 3.4 5.3 47.3 1.8 2.8
('000 ha)
Source: Irian Jaya, Kantor Statistik Tingkat 1, Irian Jaya Dalam Angka 1984, Jayapura, 1985.
News of the famine became an issue of both national and international concern following an
Australian Broadcasting Commission report of 84 deaths, many of them infants, and 13,000 persons
affected by food shortages in the Kurima region (see also Kompas, 10 and 20 December 1986; Tifa Irian
24 December 1986 and Tempo 6 December 1986).
5 Adicondro argues that the actual death toll probably did not exceed 50, bearing in mind that the
recent drought was much less severe than in 1982 in the Kurima region.
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population food balance has become a serious problem in Kurima and also in
some other isolated, already densely populated highland regions, a problem
exacerbated by higher rates of population growth related to relatively recent
declines in mortality (Kompas 7 January 1987: 7). The response to the recent crisis
appears to have been quite rapid (contrary to the impression created in both
national and international press reports), aided by increasingly intensive mission
and to a lesser extent government communications links with both dispersed
communities and between administrative centres and Jayapura. But a
longer-term solution to the problem rests in more intensive efforts to raise
agricultural productivity, diversify basic food production and consumption
patterns and to reduce the rate of population growth through encouragement of
outmigration and birth control.
Recently introduced sweet potato varieties in the Balim valley have not
demonstrated higher yields man traditional varieties, and lack of seed
multiplication centres, shortages of extension workers and communications
difficulties have all limited the introduction of new seed varieties for other crops
in most highlands regions. Although vegetables— cabbages, tomatoes, potatoes,
carrots, etc. — sold to local markets in some highland locations (especially
Wamena) provide a valuable source of cash for farmers living nearby, expansion
of commercial cropping is severely limited by the small size of urban and
administrative settlements and the high costs of air freighting these products to
coastal centres. The variable quality of local production of vegetables in the Balim
valley, partly influenced by lack of success on the part of the local agricultural
office in introducing improved seed selection and multiplication practices, has
been a major obstacle to increasing this trade, despite the more intensive air
transportation and subsidized air freight on return flights.6 For most villagers
beyond the immediate vicinity of towns, lack of transport facilities restricts the
amount of goods marketed to urban areas. 7
In 1985 the kabupaten agricultural office in Wamena had begun a project to
establish sawah in the Balim valley to meet the rice consumption needs of the
urban population, with nearly 50 hectares completed by mid 1986.8 Yields of
around 3 tonnes per hectare using seeds imported from the upland Toraja region
of South Sulawesi and high market prices of Rp 600-700 per kilogram of milled
rice are sufficient, according to local officials, to justify the high investment costs
of around Rp 0.5 million required per hectare of land converted for rice
production. But, curiously, in Irian Jaya's most densely populated region,
shortage of labour has been a major problem in meeting targets for construction
and cultivation; contract payment systems offer little incentive to local Dhani
people to participate in the project. Perhaps a more fundamental reason is the
local population's scepticism concerning the potential benefits from the project—
full-time padi cultivation forces them to neglect their traditional sweet potato
crops and become dependent on the marketing of rice for their basic consumption
6 This has been the major factor limiting purchases of vegetables by Freeport in Wamena for
consumption by employees at the mining town of Timika.
7 One typical example is the four-day return journey on foot by Ar fak tribesmen carrying sweet
potatoes and garlic to the Manokwari market, providing them with sufficient cash to buy (once local
taxi costs are taken into account) only a small packet of monosodium glutamate (vetsin) and a few
small bags of salt! (De Fretes 1986)
8 The funds were provided under the provincial INPRES (50 hectares) and Presidential Grants (30
hectares) programs. The office plans to open about 500 hectares over a 5-6 year period, an area
regarded as necessary to make Wamena self-sufficient in rice.
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needs. Here once again one sees the potential conflicts posed by the support of
programs aimed at meeting the different consumption patterns of migrants in
Irian Jaya. 9
Tree Crops
As noted earlier, traditional tree crop exports have largely stagnated in the past
fifteen years. The local agricultural office (Dinas Perkebunan) has been active in
distributing new seedlings throughout the province and in the rehabilitation of
plantings established mainly by the Dutch. Production of several commodities—
most notably cocoa and rubber—have been supported by missions and the Irian
Jaya Joint Development Fund (JDF and its trading subsidiary PT JODEFO)
through extension and marketing credit programs. But these efforts have been
insignificant compared with government budget extension support for hinterland
and transmigration food crop production, and have been severely limited in their
impact by high internal marketing margins and irregular sea communications
from small export centres.
Almost all traditional exports have stagnated in the recent past (see Table 1.2).
Copra, the major tree crop export until the early 1970s, is now only traded within
Indonesia with the estimated volume (less than 1500 tonnes in the mid 1980s) still
lower than in 1971 and about 30 per cent of production in the early 1960s. Nutmeg
and mace production have fluctuated over the years and earned only slightly
more in 1985 than 14 years ago. New cocoa and rubber exports— the latter chiefly
from plantings established by the Dutch— are still relatively small in volume. The
former appears to have relatively good prospects, especially from new
smallholder plantings in Serui and the small private estate (PT Cokran, a joint
venture operation between Commonwealth Development Commission from the
United Kingdom and JDF) at Ransiki near Manokwari. But rubber plantings of
over 1000 hectares, largely in the Merauke area, earning approximately $200,000
through transhipment of about 500-600 tonnes through Surabaya in 1985-86,
recorded extremely low levels of productivity with little prospect of significant
improvement in the future (despite improvements in processing and replanting
organized by JODEFO in the Merauke region).10 Coffee, amounting to about 80
tonnes of production in the mid 1980s, was mainly consumed locally, with some
inter-island trade. The other important new crop, cloves, has spread widely near
major urban centres, including investments by migrant businessmen near
Jayapura, but recorded relatively small volumes of inter-island trade (about 15
tonnes in 1984) in the mid 1980s.
Small volumes of production in dispersed locations make unit costs of
shipment of all these commodities relatively high and act as a major obstacle to
expansion of production. Official data suggest moreover that several thousand
farmers in various regions were involved in the production of each of these
commodities, perhaps as many as 8000-10,000 farmers throughout Irian Jaya in
the mid 1980s. The total value of production from export, inter-island trade and
local consumption amounted to not much more than US$1 million in value in the
mid 1980s, grossing about US$100 or less per household involved. These figures
imply relatively low levels of labour inputs devoted by producers to these
9 It should be noted, however, that rice has become an increasingly popular dish on festive occasions
even in the highlands and also the staple food for many urban Irianese particularly on the north coast.
10 Rubber exports are not shown in Table 1.4 since this commodity was sold through exporters in
Surabaya.
RURAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 41
activities in what for most were very much part-time secondary pursuits
supplementing other agricultural activities.
Why has the record of traditional tree crops been so poor in a country which
has been a major world producer of several of these commodities for many
decades? Low international prices of several of these commodities— especially
rubber, nutmeg and mace—provide one explanation. High internal marketing
margins and transport costs are another. Farm gate prices of rubber (Rp 240-250)
in the Merauke region were less than half the fob value of exports shipped by FT
JODEFO in the Merauke region. Poor quality latex, high costs of local river
shipments from inland Bade and Mindiptanah and of unit shipping costs to
Surabaya were the major factors at play. In the case of rubber and cocoa, the near
monopoly in marketing held by FT JODEFO (given as an incentive to ensure
regularity of purchases) has also contributed to low prices, as has the control of all
nutmeg and mace exports in the Fak-Fak region by three small Chinese trading
companies.11 Government officials report that Singapore prices were in the region
of four times the farm gate price of mace and nutmeg in the Fak-Fak region in
1986.
The FT JODEFO credit and processing support programs in rubber and cocoa
production have been criticized for lack of intensive extension efforts (Puhim and
Ansaka 1986), a criticism which might also be levelled at the government estates
service which has largely concerned itself with seed multiplication and
distribution programs. But especially in the south, coordination of marketing
extension and credit programs within a long-term subsidized program of
development would seem to be a precondition for providing higher prices and
more regular sales needed to induce farmers to devote time to more intensive tree
crop production. The PIR-BUN program, with its almost inevitable call on
migrant labour and continuing problems of land compensation in sparsely
populated areas, seems unlikely to solve the problem of raising indigenous
incomes through tree crop production. A major program of development of
smallholder tree crop production would seem justified given the now inevitable
domination of many urban jobs and more intensive food cropping by migrant
labour, and the much more flexible and extensive patterns of labour use
underlying tree crop cultivation—more in tune with traditional agricultural
pursuits—compared with new annual food crop systems.
Livestock and Fisheries
Introduction of livestock — mainly cattle, goats and sheep—by the government
Animal Husbandry Service and through credit programs supported by PT
JODEFO has been a complementary activity to other government agricultural
activities in rural areas. On the coast the program has concentrated on providing
cattle as draft animals for the transmigrant settlers with a secondary objective of
providing local supplies of beef for urban markets. It seems to have been much
more successful among migrants familiar with cattle raising than among the
indigenous population. In the Jayapura region both the government service and
PT JODEFO complain of poor credit repayment rates among Irianese, quite a
high proportion of stock losses due to failure to set aside and maintain grazing
areas, unsuitability of Brahman-cross cattle for smallholder livestock raising
techniques and sale of animals prior to repayment of credit to meet consumption
11 Private trade participation in cocoa purchasing in the Serui area (Yapen-Waropen) in 1985-86
forced PT JODEFO to raise its purchasing price from Rp 1300 to Rp 1400-1500.
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needs. In some areas such as Genyem the repayment rate has been relatively
good, however, and in the Balim valley several farmers have built up cattle
herds and used the proceeds from local sales to finance other commercial
activities.12
Introduction of Australian sheep into the Balim valley as part of the
Presidential Grants program and also through FT JODEFO has not been
successful.13 Despite short courses in management, farmers often failed to
maintain yards, and losses occurred through tape-worm contracted from pigs
and natural fodder unsuited to the new farm animals. Inadequate extension
services by the local animal husbandry office coupled with insufficient prior
research or evaluation of problems likely to arise in this new natural and social
environment seem, as with many other agriculture programs, to be the major
underlying factors for the lack of success in this endeavour. A report in the
magazine Kabar Dari Kampung (4(21), June 1986) suggests that hopes for
stimulating a local weaving industry based on wool have not been realized due
to shortages of simple weaving equipment adapted to the needs of the local
population.
Introduction of fish in inland rivers and lakes has been an important program
aimed at improving the nutritional status of the indigenous population, although
at least in the highlands this program seems to have been only partially
successful as warm water fish are not suitable for highlands conditions (Irian
Jaya, Gubernor Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Irian Jaya 1984). Much less successful
have been attempts to raise incomes of coastal people through transfer of
technology brought in by migrants (especially the bagan-bagan floating fishing
platforms), credit and cooperative marketing ventures. Fish marketing
cooperatives have been established throughout the province, but examples from
Fak-Fak and Sorong suggest many have failed as a consequence of poor
management and inadequate capital (Mambraku et al. 1984). Credit programs
initiated by FT JODEFO for motor boats and equipment in the Jayapura region
have a poor repayment record. Despite a ban since 1974 on fish bombing
introduced by migrant fishermen, this practice was still common in the Sorong
region and also practised in Biak and Jayapura in 1984. This together with
overfishing appears to have seriously depleted rich fish resources in the close
vicinity of Jayapura and Sorong (Mambraku et al. 1984; Kabar Dart Kampung 2
(7-8), April 1984).14 Fish are still relatively abundant in most other coastal areas
and a major source of protein in the diets of village people, but with the partial
exception of enterprising Serui fishermen operating in many areas of Irian Jaya,
new income opportunities related to the growth in urban demand for fresh fish
have been enjoyed largely by migrants from outside the region.
Rural Development
These notes on developments in agriculture do little justice to the multitude of
small village programs in a range of fields. These include agriculture, education,
marketing and cooperatives, health, nutrition and water supply, home industries
This was the case for one of the more successful small indigenous building contractors in the Balim
valley interviewed in August 1986.
The Animal Husbandry Office reports that of a total number of 400 sheep introduced in the early
1980s stock numbers had fallen to 200 (see also Kabar Dari Kampung 4(21), June 1986: 27-9).
14 One important factor contributing to depletion of fish resources seems to be the breakdown of
traditional taboos on fishing in the off season widely practised in Irian Jaya to around 1970.
RURAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 43
and women's self help groups, Family Welfare Organization (government
supported, women's village organization (PKK)), often initiated by mission
organizations, non-government organizations and individuals, and supported by
teachers and some local government officials. All of these activities have had an
impact on standards of living of villagers throughout Irian Jaya in the past two
decades.15 We have also only briefly covered the enormous variety of traditional
economic behaviour patterns and responses to economic change among various
tribal groups in Irian Jaya.16
Although cash incomes have probably not risen significantly for the majority
of villagers and inequalities probably sharpened between those in close contact
with urban areas and the rest of the rural population, few now remain untouched
by efforts to provide some basic social services and to extend communication
links between dispersed communities. The REPELITA IV acknowledgement that
development programs must be based on an understanding of social and cultural
practices of local peoples has to some extent been heeded, as illustrated by the
movement away from crude crash, 'civilizing' programs such as the Operasi Koteka
efforts to clothe highlanders or the introduction of ill-suited housing structures to
replace traditional honai homes. There is now a growing realization that changes
in life styles will occur only as part of more general economic advancement, with
changing agricultural practices and acquisition of cash incomes preconditions for
social change.17
Some of the dilemmas of rural development programs have been summed up in
a perceptive article by Soemardjan (1984). Three points in particular are worth
noting. First, he criticizes the emphasis on construction and provision of equipment
and materials in government programs oriented towards fulfilment of rigid,
centrally-determined financial and physical targets not matched by extension
services or based on the actual needs of the indigenous population. Many
agricultural programs seem to have faltered as a consequence of relative neglect of
extension services—the very small number of personnel and small incentives
offered to extension workers, and their relative ignorance of social practices and
economic behaviour. Similar problems are faced in the field of education discussed
earlier. These include wastage of public funds for construction of buildings in
inappropriate locations, competition between established mission schools and new
INPRES buildings for scarce teachers, and the general low quality of primary
schooling in many areas as a consequence of shortages of teachers and teaching
materials.18 Soemardjan suggests the need for more selective development
programs more in tune with local social institutions and needs.
Second, Soemardjan calls for development programs and administrative
structures more suited to the unusual natural environment and human settlement
15 Many of these are documented in Kabar Dari Kampung and the Catholic Press Foundation
publication Tifa Irian.
A recent very readable account of some of these contrasts between different groups is contained in
Boelaars (1986).
17 One example is a new approach to introduction of improved housing and clothing in the Balim
valley with the Social Affairs Office planning to coordinate integrated courses on variuos aspects of
rural development for local leaders and villagers. New styled honai houses based on the same
principles of social organization and heating provided by traditional homes have also been recently
constructed as model homes by the Social Affairs Department.
All of these points are made in studies sponsored by the Irian Jaya Rural Community Foundation
summarized in various issues of Kabar Dari Kampung; see also Adicondo, Rumbiak and Mandibondibo
(1985).
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patterns which prevail in Irian Jaya, citing the example of the inability of new
village units, kaluruhan (in rural areas, desa) to function as viable administrative
centres with the responsibility of coordinating local development efforts (1984: 8).
Finally he notes that development programs need to be designed specifically to
meet the needs of the Irian Jaya population, with efforts made to reduce the
emphasis on construction of new facilities which will inevitably benefit more
mobile commercially oriented peoples from elsewhere in Indonesia. Although the
transmigration program in Irian Jaya has its origins in national rather than
regional development priorities, one major side effect has been to absorb large
amounts of public funds in agriculture, education, health and the like, and divert
scarce government personnel to coping with the problems faced by the projects.
This has limited resources available for activities of greater potential benefit to
Irianese. The neglect of smallholder tree crops is one example of the latter.
Finally, mention should be made of the impact of new development programs
on the fragile ecological balance which has been maintained for centuries by
traditional hunting, fishing and agricultural practices. Mention has already been
made of the impact on marine resources from overfishing and of logging
company activities on soil erosion, flooding and pollution of local water supplies.
Erosion resulting from uncontrolled tree felling for new settlements such as the
kabupaten capital of Wamena in the Balim valley, especially the substantial
consumption of local timber for tile and brick making for local housing, is one
example of the environmental consequences of development.19 Numerous
construction activities — transmigration site roads, airstrips, school buildings—
have been identified by the Irian Jaya Rural Community Development
Foundation as having an adverse environmental effect on land use and economic
activities of the local population, many of which might have been avoided
through careful environmental and social impact studies conducted prior to the
planning of new construction sites. Such an approach will inevitably challenge the
vested interests in rapid turnover of construction projects and slow down the pace
of economic change. This would seem essential, however, if the village population
is to benefit significantly from new development programs.
19 See Kabar Dari Kampung 2 (2),April 1984.
CHAPTERS
Transmigration
In 1977 Irian Jaya was declared a major transmigration recipient region by
Presidential decree leading, in REPELITA III, to the beginnings of a large-scale
settlement program of mainly poor Javanese in the province. The transmigration
program in Irian Jaya has probably been the subject of more controversy,
particularly in international circles, than it has been in relation to any other
province of Indonesia. In addition to the problems experienced by transmigrants
caused by the magnitude of the targets and short time frame allowed for their
realization, the impact on the indigenous Irianese population and the natural
environment has been a focus of critics of the transmigration program and its
targets. This is especially so in a province where political sovereignty remains an
international issue in some circles and where the benefits of development for the
local population have received continuing national and international attention.
Foreign assistance to transmigration and especially the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) support for the program have been
in the spotlight, particularly with the greatly increased program for Irian Jaya
announced for REPELITA IV in 1984. *
An evaluation of the success of the transmigration program in Irian Jaya, in
terms of both raising incomes of the new settlers and contributing to regional
development, and also through its impact on the local population directly affected
by the program, should be viewed in the broad perspective of central and
provincial government perceptions of potential benefits and of the program in
Irian Jaya. From a central government standpoint Irian Jaya has been viewed as
having extensive, largely unexploited land resources with considerable potential
for agricultural development and suffering from major problems of labour
shortage for resource exploitation and development projects.2 In language
reminiscent of the pronouncements of Sukarno concerning the capacity of
Indonesia to sustain a much larger population through exploitation of extensive
land areas outside Java and Bali, frequent mention by government officials of the
extensive land areas in Irian Jaya (three and a half times that of Java) supporting
one per cent of the total population of Java, and its low population density
relative to all other Indonesian provinces, underlies a belief that this province
1 See especially the special edition of the Ecologist in early 1986 (Volume 16, Nos 2/3) focusing on the
transmigration program in Indonesia with special reference to Irian Jaya, including an open letter to
Mr Clauson as retiring President of the World Bank seeking a major re-evaluation of the program.
Also of influence outside Indonesia have been the largely politically inspired attacks on the
transmigration program contained in West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, TAPOL (1985), and
Budiardjo's (1986) article in the Ecologist, and a subsequent open letter to Mr Clausen's successor, Mr
Conable, from representatives of a wide range of non governmental organizations involved in
developing country programs (writing under the umbrella of the Environmental Defence Fund)
dealing with Mr Clauson's reply to the Ecologist and responses to other citizens groups. Several
Indonesians and Indonesian non-governmental groups have also focused on the environmental impact
of the program and exhorted the World Bank to re-evaluate its policies in the area of transmigration
(although they have also dismissed some of the more extreme foreign criticisms of the transmigration
program). See especially Adicondro (1986b, 1986c).
Labour shortages as a major constraint to development in Irian Jaya have been a continuing theme in
REPELITA documents from the first five-year plan drawn up in 1969.
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should play a major role in redistributing population away from densely
populated Java for several decades to come.
The provincial government, with both Irianese and migrant officials, have been
no less enthusiastic about the potential of Irian Jaya to support a vastly larger
population. The current Governor sees resettlement of migrants as a major
justification for developing infrastructure to remote areas throughout the
province, extending government administration and enabling exploitation of Irian
Jaya's rich resources.3 A second, equally important motive for enthusiasm for
transmigration by the provincial government has been the desire to lessen
dependence on often uncertain inter-island trade in basic foodstuffs (especially
rice) and the high cost of living and large price fluctuations of foodstuffs in urban
areas. Settlement of 'high technology' Javanese farmers has been viewed as the
major means of achieving these goals, encouraging transfer of knowledge of new
farming practices to largely subsistence-oriented indigenous agriculturalists who
would be encouraged in the longer term to develop sedentary, commercially-
oriented agriculture.
Two brief points need to be made concerning the overall availability of land
for agricultural settlement in the transmigration program. First, although this
overall picture of considerable agricultural potential and possibilities for more
intensive land use patterns appears broadly consistent with data classified by the
Directorate of Agrarian Affairs on land available and used for agricultural
purposes, it does require substantial qualification. Less than half of Irian Jaya's
total land area is classified as suitable for cultivation, only about one-third for
food crop production and slightly more than 10 per cent for wet rice cultivation
with one crop a year (the land area targeted for most transmigration settlements).
Given relatively little knowledge of actual soil fertility and ecological systems
even these figures are likely to represent a major overstatement of actual
agricultural potential.4 Second, as we have noted above, the rich natural resource
potential of Irian Jaya has been overstated — at least in terms of current world
prices and in comparison with the more accessible resources at present being
exploited elsewhere in Indonesia. Many forest areas have a low commercial value
and there have been no recent discoveries of economically viable mineral and oil
resources, with the exception of copper at Mount Ertzberg and the dwindling oil
wells near Sorong, despite the flurry of exploration activity in the 1970s.
Turning to transmigration targets and their realization over the past 20 years,
from a relatively small movement of about 1500 families from 1964-78, the target
for REPELITA III (1979/80-1983/84) was increased to 20,000 households (about
100,000 persons), a goal which was largely achieved by early 1986 (Table 5.1).
Despite substantial problems incurred on a large number of these sites, the target
was raised sevenfold for the subsequent REPELITA IV to approximately 138,000
families, almost 700,000 persons, suggesting a projected increase in the total
provincial population of more than half due to transmigration alone.
Despite largely unsubstantiated claims that the central government's principal
aims have been to 'Javanize' Irian Jaya (although at least in demographic terms
this probably would have been one result of the achievement of the above
targets) and create a cordon sanitaire along the border with Papua New Guinea
to deal with security problems, this massive increase in transmigration targets
Personal communication with the authors.
' This would certainly be the case if mistakes in land and soil classification applied equally to Irian
Jaya as in areas of Central Kalimantan (see Secrett 1986). See also Adicondro's note in Kabar Dari
Kampung, 3 (18), December 1985.
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Table 5.1 Transmigration targets and their realization in Irian Jaya, 1964-August 1986
Target
Initial Revised
(No. of households)
Realization to August 1986
No. of Per cent of No. of
households original individuals
target
Up to REPELITA III
(1964-78) (l,527)a - 1,527 (100)a 6,291b
REPELITA III
(1979-83/84) 20,000 19,324 19,156 96 78,406
REPELITA IV
Yearl 21,900 14,201 2,177 10 10,191
Year 2 16,400 8,125 120
YearS 25,500 3,105 1,303C 5 5,160
Subtotal 63,800 25,431 3,600 6 15,351
All REPELITA IV 137,800 136,500d 3,600 3 15,351
All years 85,327 ? 24,283 38 100,048
(1964-August 1986)
aNo data on targets in the early years.
bEstimate.
To August 1983.
dRevised in 1985.
Source: Irian Jaya, Kanwil Transmigrasi, Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura (various publications).
occurred mainly for other reasons. It is principally related to the shortage of
suitable land in traditional areas of destination in southern Sumatra, and the
search for alternative venues outside Java to meet the expanded national target of
750,000 households (including partially or non assisted self-supporting (swakarsa)
transmigrants). Both sparsely populated Central and East Kalimantan also
received major increases in allocations for the current five-year plan, together
with Irian Jaya accounting for just on half the national target (Hardjono 1986) Less
than 25 per cent of all transmigrants planned for settlement in Irian Jaya in
REPELITA IV were to be situated in three major areas close to the Irian
Jaya-Papua New Guinea border (within a distance of approximately 50 to 75
kilometres from the border) at Senggi, Arso and Bupul. Even in the border
kabupaten of Jayapura and Merauke, which together account for slightly over half
the transmigration target, less than 50 per cent of all transmigrants are to be
located in areas at all close to the border region. Claims that the expanded
transmigration program was drawn up with the prime objective of sealing the 600
kilometre border with Papua New Guinea would appear, therefore, to be largely
unfounded, although the location of planned settlements in strategic areas
undoubtedly has been influenced by security objectives. It is also worth pointing
out that the resettlement of retired military personnel has been a very small
component, certainly no more than 5 per cent, of the total transmigration flow so
far (Adicondro 1986b). 5
Whatever the motives for planning to greatly expand the transmigration
program in Irian Jaya during REPELITA IV, a drastic reassessment of the targets
5 It is noteworthy, moreover, that revisions in 1985 of the original destination areas (drawn up prior to
the border crossing incidents in 1984) actually excluded several new settlements to be established
along the border owing to their unsuitability as upland settlement areas (Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18),
December 1985: 14-15).
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and program of resettlement was underway by late 1985, one and a half years into
REPELITA IV.6 Although no revision to the five-year target had been made, the
target for resettlement had been more than halved for the first three years of the
plan. In the first two years of REPELITA IV only 10 per cent of the revised target
had been fulfilled, and the target for the third year of the plan (1986/87) had been
revised to only a little over 10 per cent of the original figure (see Table 5.1). In all,
at close to the mid point in the five-year plan (August 1986) less than 3 per cent,
or 3600 households, of the original target had actually been resettled in Irian Jaya.7
It is widely rumoured, and predicted by the World Bank, that the REPELITA IV
transmigration target for assisted migrants for Indonesia as a whole will be
reduced by about one half or less, and in Irian Jaya reduced to 20,000-30,000
households, a target already looking rather ambitious compared with
achievements to date. Emphasis has also moved away from the almost exclusive
dependence on Javanese (and Balinese) to include a considerable number of
transmigrants from eastern Indonesia (especially Flores) beginning in 1986.8 It
also appears that there has been a major reassessment of the capacity of border
regions to absorb large numbers of transmigrants especially in upland areas.9
Why this rather dramatic (unannounced) turnabout in policy? The most
important reason has been, of course, the cutback in the national budget and
especially development expenditures at the national level beginning in 1986/87
and on a greater scale in 1987/88.10 The transmigration program has been one of
the prime targets in budget reductions. Why has this been so, and why
specifically in Irian Jaya? First, by the end of the first year of REPELITA TV it was
becoming increasingly clear that problems of large-scale settlement in the new,
less developed provinces were much greater than had been the case in Sumatra.
There appears to be a growing awareness in Jayapura and Jakarta, encouraged by
World Bank evaluation results, that without a program of consolidation and
'second stage' development in a large number of sites, the incomes and standards
of living of transmigrants are likely to remain very low in Irian Jaya. Second,
major conflicts with the indigenous population especially over land compensation
have convinced the provincial government that attempts should be made to settle
these issues prior to construction and resettlement. And, finally, although the
Indonesian government has rejected much of the questioning of its objectives,
considerable criticism of the potential demographic social and economic impact of
the greatly expanded transmigration program has probably encouraged the
See interview with the head of the Provincial Transmigration Office reported in Kabar Dari Kampung
3 (18), December 1985.
7 These figures understate the numbers actually moved during this period because the government
was also making up for shortfalls in its target for the previous REPELITA.
The resettlement of eastern Indonesians has been enthusiastically supported by the dynamic Eastern
Nusa Tenggara Governor Ben Mboi who has suggested up to 50,000 households from his region are
likely to benefit from transmigration to Irian Jaya. The central and provincial governments are interest
ed in this reorientation partly because of the saving in transportation costs and partly to help diffuse
the issues of 'Javanization' and 'Islami/ation' associated with the past concentration on Java as the ma
jor source of migrants. See Kabar Dari Kampung(\S (3), December 1985) and Adicondro (1987b).
9 The head of the Jayapura office mentioned 500 households or less for these settlements. Senggi, for
example, near Jayapura (ostensibly included as a site for relocation of many of the 1984 border cross-
ers) with an original target of 10,000 households would receive only 100! This site has subsequently
been cancelled altogether, at least for REPELITA IV.
10 The national budget for transmigration was cut from Rp 677 billion in 1985/86 to Rp 395 billion in
1986/87 with a further decline by two-thirds to Rp 111 billion ($68 million) in 1987/88 (about one-
third of the latter is to be funded from foreign sources, mainly the World Bank). See The Asian Wall
Street Journal (5 March 1987).
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Table 5.2 Regional distribution of transmigrant households settled in Irian Jaya, 1964-
August 1986
Region 1964-79 1979/80-
83/84
1984/85- Total
Aug. 86
Percent Approx. percent
of kabupaten
population 1986
Merauke 169 6213 368 6750 28 14
Sorong 150 6484 74 6708 27 17
Jayapura 637 2274 1610 4521 19 9
Manokwari 449 2150 1228 3827 16 16
Paniai (Nabire) 261 2035 - 22% 9 5
Fak-Fak (Timika) - - 320 320 1 2
Total 1666 19156 3600 24422 100 6"
Per cent 7 78 15
Percentage of provincial population.
Source: Irian Jaya, Kanwil Transmigrasi Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura (various publications).
government to tread much more warily, especially in Irian Jaya. We look briefly at
these issues below first, dealing with the 'success' of the program in terms of
raising the living standards of transmigrants and, second, the impact of the
program on the local population and environment, and its contribution to overall
regional development.
The Program and Welfare of Transmigrants
Prior to REPELITA III, small transmigration settlements were dispersed in various
regions, before 1969 principally in the potential rice growing region of Merauke
(Kumbe, Kurik and Kuprik) and during REPELITA I and REPELITA II close to
Jayapura, Nabire (Paniai), Manokwari and Sorong—all on the north coast (Table
5.2). During REPELITA III two-thirds of all households were settled in the flat
plains north and west of Merauke and in the more undulating, dryland areas
close to Sorong, with the balance going to north coast settlements close to
Jayapura, Nabire in Teluk Cenderawasih and Manokwari. While Merauke has
long been viewed as the potential hinterland for rice production in Irian Jaya,
Sorong was chosen partly because of projected rapid urban growth and demand
for labour and foodstuffs associated with natural resource and fisheries
development, and partly because the long history of commercial contact with
eastern Indonesia was likely to facilitate integration with the indigenous
population.
Although Merauke was targeted as the major recipient region for the greatly
expanded REPELITA IV program (36 per cent of the 138,000 household target for
the province), continuing problems faced in consolidating viable settlements
established during REPELITA III has meant only a small proportion (10 per cent)
of all households moved during REPELITA IV have been settled there. Almost
half of REPELITA IV settlers have gone to Jayapura, mainly to the border
settlements of Koya and Arso (including the palm oil PIR-BUN settlement at
Arso), and a further one-third to Prafi, Manokwari also partly for the palm oil
plantation established there.
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Due to difficulties encountered in the early years of settlement in the major
recipient areas of Merauke and Sorong, long distances and high transportation
costs from Java (approximately Rp 50,000 by boat from Surabaya to Sorong and
Rp 75,000 to Jayapura and Merauke), swakarsa unassisted or partially assisted
transmigrants have been a relatively small proportion of the total number of
families moved compared with other provinces in Indonesia. The contrast is
particularly marked with well established settlements in southern Sumatran
provinces where swakarsa transmigrants have made up the large majority of new
settlers in recent years (Hardjono 1986: 42). Central government figures report
approximately 2000 swakarsa transmigrant families, a little over 25 per cent of all
settlers to Irian Jaya under the program, during the first two years of REPELITA
IV, but even these figures are almost certainly an overestimate compared with
provincial data: a figure of 5-10 per cent for all transmigrants moved to Irian Jaya
is probably closer to reality.11
In some ways the movement of over 20,000 families in the past seven years to far
flung, dispersed settlements, many largely virgin forest areas, might be judged a
considerable achievement. Although a few of the settlements, most notably on the
island of Salawati near Sorong and close to Merauke, were found to be
inappropriate for sedentary rice agriculture, the majority have fulfilled their
original objective of providing a new place of settlement for largely poor and
landless Javanese. No data are available on the numbers leaving the new
settlements as a consequence of economic hardship. But only a relatively small
proportion, perhaps 10-15 per cent, have done so.12 Partly, of course, the high cost
and irregularity of return land and sea transport from existing sites help to explain
this. Nevertheless, after initial periods of hardship by no means unique in the
history of the transmigration program elsewhere in Indonesia, agricultural
production, most notably of rice but also of vegetable crops and fruit, has risen
considerably. Rice yields of 4-6 tonnes of gabah (dry, unmilled rice) are not unusual
in many of the older locations and these, unlike some areas in Kalimantan, have
been sustained after several years of settlement. The physical appearance of some
of the older settlements are not unlike some of the villages in lowland Java, at least
during the wet season, with intensively cultivated house gardens sporting a wide
variety of annual and perennial crops, many households making major
improvements to their original, simple houses allocated under the program and the
greenery providing an initial impression of relative prosperity. Agricultural
produce, vegetables and fruit, from locations in close proximity to major cities,
Arso near Jayapura, Aimas I and II near Sorong, and Kurik near Merauke, and even
more distant settlements such as Nimbokrang about 100 kilometres from Jayapura,
are sold in urban markets often at prices several times those in Java. They provide a
major source of cash income for the new settlers in addition to the staple food
crops— rice and to a lesser extent corn and cassava.13
11 For the year 1985/86, for example, the local transmigration office reports that only 186 swakarsa
families, and a much larger number of 585 new families formed in the transmigration sites (pecahan
keluarga) were settled, swakarsa migrants contributing only 6 per cent of the total number of trans
migrants.
12 Adicondro (1986b) mentions a figure of 1500 households permanently leaving the transmigration
areas to settle in urban areas in Irian Jaya, although elsewhere (1986c) he mentions a higher figure of
10-20 per cent. This should include several airloads of households returned to Java from the Merauke
region who left one ill-planned site and whose women folk engaged in 'unsavoury' activities in the
town in 1984-86.
13 See also Hastings (1983) on a report of the Dosay and Koya projects near Jayapura. The above
observations are based on discussion with various informants in Jayapura, Sorong and Merauke and
visits to transmigration sites in all three regions in August-September 1986.
TRANSMIGRATION 51
Official transmigration figures report rice as the major crop in the three largest
transmigration areas (Merauke, Sorong and Jayapura) but, whereas in Merauke
rice dominates all other crops, in Sorong and Jayapura a much more diversified
pattern of agriculture is evident. Corn (mainly in Jayapura) and cassava (mainly
in Sorong) hectarage is not much below that of rice, and soya beans in particular
is a major cash crop.14 In the Sorong region, at the Aimas I and II settlements in
particular, perennial fruit and other tree crops— cloves, coffee and cocoa— are
widespread and it is hoped that the non-fruit tree crops will provide a valuable
source of income in the future.
Various reports of recent harvests in Sorong (1985) and Merauke quote high
rice yields (see earlier) but on average yields from all crops on the transmigration
sites in 1985/86 were all substantially below those achieved in Java— rice being
closer to 2 than 4 tonnes of unmilled gabah per hectare, and most non vegetable
annuals recording yields of around 1 tonne per hectare. Relatively poor soils,
unfamiliarity with seasonal patterns and pest outbreaks seem to have been the
major factors reducing yields.
The new schools, mainly primary but also several secondary schools opened in
the older settlements, many bicycles and some motorbikes, even a few privately
owned four-wheel drive vehicles, and the ubiquitous waning (small shop, stall) all
give the impression of living standards better than could have been hoped for in
Java for some transmigrant families. In many areas also cash incomes from
agriculture have provided a stimulus to home industry and service activities. A
government report on Jayapura settlements still administered by the
transmigration department records manufacture of tahu and tempe as the major
home industry undertaken by 3-7 households in each location and radio and
bicycle repair shops, and tailors are all represented (Irian Jaya Kanwil
Transmigrasi 1986).
These gains have been achieved, however, at considerable cost and not
without many initial failures; they have been unevenly spread throughout the
transmigration areas and agricultural productivity is heavily dependent on
subsidized inputs supplied from outside Irian Jaya.
In both Merauke and Sorong, lack of an understanding of local climatic
patterns, the appropriate timing of cultivation, and toxicity of soils were major
initial problems in early years. Modest to good rice yields only were achieved in
both areas; this was especially so after successive harvest failures in Sorong prior
to the first bumper harvest (panen raya) in 1985, following advice given from
outside agronomists on nutrients required by the soils (especially sulphur and
phosphate). In rice growing areas, reasonable yields are dependent on large
inputs of fertilizer and pesticides subsidized under a special program of food
(rice) development in Irian Jaya. Even under this program delivery of inputs
appears to have been irregular and yields substantially influenced as a
consequence (Kompas 8 April 1983). In Merauke, the major complaints from
farmers are about delays in delivery of inputs; in Sorong (Aimas II) in 1986 this
problem meant farmers had to purchase fertilizer and pesticides at 2-3 times the
government subsidized price. It is likely that the end of priorities which
transmigrants have received under the subsidized input program—extending for
the first three years of settlement— will considerably increase problems of access
to purchased inputs and may result in substantial yield declines.
Marketing problems are no less intractable especially in less accessible areas.
14 See Indonesia, KamvO Transmigrasi (1986) for details. The data, especially on production, are only
very broad guesstimates.
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Dependence on irregular, slow river transport in the Merauke area—a journey of
100-150 kilometres taking up to two days along the Maro river to Merauke during
the wet season when most roads are impassable— severely constrains attempts to
market perishable vegetables. Near Sorong in one newly settled location about 50
kilometres from the city, farmers were selling tomatoes at Rp 100 per kilogram,
less than one-tenth of the market price in Sorong in September 1976, due to lack
of regular transport to the city.15 Unit transport costs are high and given relatively
small consumer demand in some areas such as Merauke (a total urban population
of only 16,000 in 1980, and about 19,000 in 1985) the possibility of the bottom
dropping out of the market following a glut in the production of particular food
crops increases the risk of food crop activities. These problems are not unique to
Irian Jaya, but they do indicate the continuing problems associated with
inadequate infrastructure development and a lack of budget allocations for
maintenance, and little economic analysis of potential income effects of food
production regimes in the new transmigration areas.
As in other areas of Indonesia, the nucleus estate (PIR-BUN) tree crop
program, supported by the World Bank as a vastly improved model compared
with food crop settlements for transmigration areas, has also been introduced in
Irian Jaya. Transmigrants have already been moved to new oil palm estates under
the management of PTP II (Medan) at Arso (Jayapura) and Prafi (Manokwari).
The Prafi estate is reported to be well advanced but at Arso withdrawal of local
labour following continuing disputes over compensation for incomes forgone as a
result of the cutting down of sago groves, loss of traditional hunting and fishing
sources of livelihood, and uncertainty regarding the location of the processing
facility, are all problems still to be solved.16 Nevertheless the majority of sites
already established and awaiting transmigrants,17 and also new areas targeted for
transmigration, are still designed for food crops, although planting of perennials
has also been encouraged.
The search for new locations not only forces the selection of marginal sites in
terms of soil fertility (Hardjono 1986), but equally important in relatively
underdeveloped regions such as Irian Jaya, means less suitable locations in terms
of potential marketing margins and transport costs. In Irian Jaya these problems
would seem to be particularly severe due to the lack of indigenous commercial
farming settlements which might provide demand for some of the products from
transmigration areas.
Many of these problems of adaptation are common throughout transmigration
areas in Indonesia and to some extent are regarded by the government as an
unavoidable cost of opening up new areas of settlement. As in other locations,
they have been exacerbated by the attempt to impose unusually stringent
targets— as the head of the Transmigration Office in Irian Jaya points out, a
consequence of a site development program which theoretically should take 5
years, being crammed into half or less of that time period (Kabar Dart Kampung 3
(18), December 1985: 19-20). But some difficulties have their origins in aspects of
the planning and execution of the program which have been especially
15 The problem was exacerbated by a road construction program.
16 Following continued local protests concerning the provincial government and the estate's neglect of
the compensation issue, the matter was reported to have been subsequently taken up by the provincial
parliament (DPRD) with a strong promise of support from its vocal chairman Bas Suebo in late 1986.
See Tanah Air 6 (67), October 1 986: 5-6, 11 .
17 It has been estimated that about 7000 houses in various new locations were still awaiting new
arrivals in mid 1986.
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unfavourable in Irian Jaya. Many of the original sites were inadequately surveyed
and especially in the Merauke region, some had to be abandoned after settlement
and others shifted to more appropriate nearby locations. Poorly prepared
fly-by-night contractors, many from Jakarta seeking windfall profits from the
construction boom, have fallen far behind in targets and left sites only partially
prepared. Some sites approved by transmigration officials, have neglected
fundamental aspects of viable agricultural systems and health in the new
settlements, most notably adequate drainage (Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18),
December 1985). Outbreaks of malaria in several areas (mainly in the regions of
Jayapura and Manokwari) which had claimed 41 lives to the end of 1985 and
seven more in 1986 have been attributed partly to inappropriate site preparation.
In the early 1980s lack of involvement of the provincial and Itabupaten officials
combined with low levels of expertise within the Itabupaten government, and poor
coordination between government departments appear to have been major factors
contributing to the disappointing preparation of sites.
Merauke, targeted as the major region for rice production in Irian Jaya largely
through the development of transmigration sites, has perhaps received most
attention concerning the long-term economic viability of transmigration sites.
Almost all the new locations have been established for wet rice cultivation, with
over half of all transmigrants being settled at Kumbe, about 40 kilometres north of
Merauke. In 1985/86 transmigration sites were reported to have produced
approximately 9000 tonnes of padi (gabah kering), well over half the total
production of padi in the Itabupatenof Merauke and about one-third of the
estimated consumption needs of the Vabupaten; provincial data estimate overall
wet rice land yields at about 4 tonnes of gabah per hectare— a surprisingly high
(and probably significantly overstated) figure compared with closer to 2 tonnes
per hectare reported by the Transmigration Office for transmigration areas.18 A
high proportion of the reported increase in rice production for Irian Jaya in recent
years, more than tripling since 1983 (see above), has derived from transmigration
areas in this region.
Despite these impressive figures, there have been major problems of rice
production and economic welfare of transmigrants in the Merauke region. Many
padi growing areas, formerly classified as irrigated, depend on uncertain rainfall
and crops are grown only once a year. Pests and plant diseases, as in the Sorong
region, continue to be a major problem, including the tungro virus, wereng, rice
blast, rats and wallabies ((Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18), December 1985). Cultivation
of dry season crops is severely hampered by lack of water which frequently needs
to be transported several kilometres even for consumption purposes. Rice
producers are obliged to sell to the local Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD) but often have to
transport their padi on foot considerable distances to nearby villages where
processing facilities and KUD purchasing facilities are available. The Regency Rice
Procurement Agency (DOLOG) price of Rp 175/kilogram of dry padi is regarded as
barely profitable given the high prices of inputs often purchased outside the
government controlled prices.19 Although DOLOG rice prices in Irian Jaya are now
on a par with other areas of Indonesia, following the removal of the special subsidy
for Irian Jaya consumers (Garnaut and Manning 1974), the potential economic
viability of rice production on less fertile soils in relatively isolated locations with
high marketing costs of inputs and outputs remains a major issue.
The latter figure is probably an understatement however as some of the area reported to be devoted
to rice production was probably uncultivated or planted to other crops.
Interview with head farmers group (Kelompok Tani) from Semangga II, Merauke, reported in Kabar
Dari Kampung December 1985: 27-8.
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The head of the provincial transmigration office has pointed out that the
emphasis on rice production has been at the request of the provincial government
rather than a priority established in Jakarta by transmigration planners.20 He sees
Merauke, for example, as not well suited to food crop development (somewhat of
an irony given the almost exclusive preoccupation with rice in Merauke
settlements to date) and sees tree crop development as a more suitable future
pattern for new sites in the region. But the latter pattern of development is still in
the early stages of planning with attention still to be given to problems of suitable
sites and crops, the need for larger land areas per household (minimal 3 hectares
as at Arso— ideally 3-5 hectares), and means of support during crop gestation
periods.
The response of transmigrants to marked seasonality in agricultural
production and shortages of cash income in off-peak periods, especially during
the long dry season in the south near Merauke, has been to seek seasonal work in
the major towns. The migrants provide new services in the towns but also create
added pressure in the search for urban employment, a problem experienced in
several transmigration regions elsewhere in Indonesia (Hardjono 1977; Arndt
1986). Thus, in addition to the 'spontaneous' migrants from South Sulawesi and
Maluku, Javanese also compete with the local population for wage work in
construction and self-employed activities in trade and transport during off-peak
periods in agriculture. One observer of transmigration in Sorong noted that the
large majority of households earned some income from non-agricultural pursuits
mainly in the town of Sorong. The overall impact is to depress wages and
discourage temporary, wage earning activities by Irianese living close to urban
areas.
Revision of transmigration targets for REPELITA IV, will undoubtedly give the
government breathing space to reassess the overall program. But even the size of
the current number of settlers is likely to create longer-term problems bearing in
mind that no land has been reserved for agricultural activities of the children of
transmigrants. The ideal allocation of 6 hectares per family aimed for by the
Transmigration Department (to be divided equally between the transmigrant
households, swakarsa transmigrants and the children of transmigrants) has not
been adhered to in the REPELITA III and IV settlements. Normal sized locations
of 1000 hectares have been made available for 500 households or an average of 2
hectares per household (Kabar Dart Kampung 3 (18), December 1985: 26).
Fulfilment of targets at all costs, the hallmark of the program to the mid 1980s, is
likely to bring a host of second stage employment problems in small, dispersed
settlements as the communities grow older.
Benefits to the Local Population and the Land Issue
The demographic impact of the expanded transmigration program since 1979 has
been relatively small compared with some rather far fetched estimates, and the
original REPELITA FV targets (see TAPOL 1983: 54-63). Over the period 1979-86 a
total of just under 94,000 persons (slightly above 4 persons per household), were
settled in transmigration sites, approximately 13,000 of these consisting of local
transmigrants. Assuming that about 20 per cent of the latter were non-Irian born,
then transmigrants from outside Irian Jaya accounted for about 6 per cent of the
total Irian Jaya population, about 15 per cent of the Irian-born population, and
about 10 per cent of the rural population of Irian Jaya in 1986 (see Table 2.4).21
20 See interview reported in Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18), December 1985: 25-6.
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About one-quarter of the estimated total population increase during the period
1979-86 consisted of transmigrants from outside Irian Jaya.22 Of course, the
demographic impact of the program has been much greater in recipient kecamatans
where in most cases the transmigrant population would have outnumbered the
Irianese population by 1986, and in the kabupaten of Merauke and Sorong. It has
also been much greater, as has the spontaneous movement of migrants to Irian
Jaya, in the lowland regions close to major cities that have been the main areas of
focus of the transmigration program.
Nevertheless, given the numbers actually moved over the past seven years, the
figures do help to put in perspective the overall impact of transmigration on the
distribution of population between Irianese and migrants. Even if one takes
account of the children born to transmigrants in addition to the flow of new
transmigrants, and assuming an average annual transfer of 15,000 persons to Irian
Jaya to the end of the century, the total transmigrant population would not exceed
half a million persons in the year 2000. This would amount to one-third of an
estimated indigenous population of about 1.6 million. Given past trends, the
much publicized threat of the Javanese becoming a majority in Irian Jaya largely
through transmigration is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future. It is
true, nevertheless, that the major urban areas of Irian Jaya and their hinterlands
settled by both unassisted migrants and transmigrants already support a high
proportion of migrants, and these areas are likely to be largely dominated by
migrants by the end of the century.
As in other provinces where shifting cultivation, and hunting and gathering
activities have been major sources of income for the local population and where
traditional communal land rights covering extensive, 'uncultivated' areas are
vested with clan and tribal groups, the issues of land compensation and local
participation in the transmigration settlements have raised problems in many sites
in Irian Jaya. The size of the targets beginning from REPELITA III and the short
time span allowed for their achievement have exacerbated difficulties inherent in
negotiation of land for new sites, forcing the government to forgo intensive
extension efforts required to ensure full participation of 'local' transmigrants in
agricultural activities. These problems have not been helped by Java-centric views
which tend to equate low population density with large, unclaimed land areas
much of which is believed to have no economic value to the indigenous population,
and beliefs that traditional agricultural, hunting, gathering and fishing activities
are basically primitive and have to be quickly transformed into a 'modern',
sedentary (and preferably sawah) farming mould. As with the resettlement
program coordinated by the Department of Social Affairs, administrative and
security objectives have been important factors behind the decision to develop
larger Irianese settlements.
Tribal leaders have been offered a variety of incentives to hand over land to the
provincial government for transmigration sites. These include cash compensation
for existing crops and plants (especially sago groves) which provide a basic source
of income for local inhabitants, and the offer of participation in the new settlements
This assumes overall population growth rates in the absence of transmigration of approximately
2.7 per cent (the estimated figure for the intercensal period 1971-80), and of the Irian bom population
of about 2.3 per cent.
22 It should be noted that this figure is very much lower than the World Bank estimate of closer to the
50 per cent transmigration component of the increment in Irian Jaya's population over the period
1980-85. The 50 per cent figure would apply, again approximately, to all migrants to Irian Jaya over
this period.
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and use of public facilities established on them. More recently, expenditures have
been made on improvements to housing and preparation of agricultural sites,
similar to those provided for transmigrants in new settlements. In some areas tribal
leaders appear to have, at least initially, willingly given up land to new settlers.
They have been attracted by the prospect of both new roads linking isolated areas
to urban centres and the potential benefits offered to the local population from the
establishment of health and educational facilities. Local leaders have accepted
small amounts of cash compensation for crops and commercially valuable plants
destroyed during the construction of transmigration facilities. Adicondro (1986b:
12) notes that initial reluctance to give up land has only been a 'minor factor in
some isolated areas'.
But in some regions survey and construction work has gone ahead leading to
continuing conflicts with the local population as has occurred at Arso near
Jayapura. More important causes of conflict, however, appear to have been the
failure of the government to adequately compensate for or take account of income
lost from traditional hunting activities, payments made in kind rather than in cash
as demanded by the local population, and the large profits made by some
contractors from the sale of timber cut down in the new sites. One notable example
is the above mentioned case of the PIR project at Arso and complaints of the Skou
tribe, the traditional land owners of the area now supporting over 1000
transmigrant households at Koya close to Jayapura.23 The land area originally
agreed upon by the local population for transmigration was reported to be 3300
hectares with compensation for sago stands and fishing areas amounting to Rp 130
million. But over 5000 hectares were taken over at the new site and to the
disappointment of the local population compensation was provided in the form of
building materials rather than cash. The local leader (ondoafi) Herman Rollo
complained, moreover, of felling and sale by contractors of rattan and martoa
timber (the former alone valued at about Rp 300 million) from which the local
population earned cash income through the sale of matoa fruit. Competition from
transmigrants for mudjair fish in traditional ponds and in hunting wild pigs and
kaswari was a further complaint. Only ten members of the Skou tribe have been
reported to have joined the transmigration settlement, the majority of other settlers
selected from the local population (translokal) coming from other areas of Jayapura.
Not surprisingly the ondoafi saw few benefits flowing to the traditional landowners
from the transmigration project.
Conflicts over land appropriated for transmigration have been most marked in
the Jayapura region (at Koya, Arso and Nimbokrang II) where traditional leaders
are supported by educated Irianese and non-government organizations and where
the conflicts between spontaneous migrants and local landowners are a major
problem. But the issue of appropriate compensation for loss of hunting income (es
pecially for the deer hunting Marind people in the Merauke region) and division of
spoils from forest exploitation between local transmigration officials and contrac
tors appears to be a general phenomenon. The head of the provincial transmigration
office admitted frankly in his interview with Kabar Dari Kampung that past projects
have been hampered by the failure of kabupaten officers to secure agreement for
transfer of land prior to the decision to proceed with transmigration projects, and
that future settlements will not be planned until written agreement is obtained from
the local inhabitants. Nevertheless the gap between indigenous values concerning
the economic use of land (aside from the issue of its spiritual and social significance)
and the government's evaluation of economic worth on the one hand, and the
23 See Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18), December 1985 for a detailed account.
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commercial interests of contractors and government officials on the other, are likely
to remain obstacles to smooth implementation of the new policy.
Acceptance of transmigration settlements by the local population depends
partly on the success of efforts to encourage participation of the indigenous
people as local transmigrants in the new sites. Since 1982 25 per cent of places in
the transmigration settlements (compared with 10 per cent allocated elsewhere in
Indonesia) have been reserved for local residents, either in separate, adjoining
blocks or interdispersed with regular transmigrant households. Overall, the
policy of encouraging local participation has been only partially successful.
Official data suggest the 10 per cent translokal target established prior to 1982/83
was largely fulfilled in all kabupaten but there has been a wide range in regional
experience in meeting the higher 25 per cent figure established since then. The
local participation program has largely failed in Merauke where a low 3 per cent
of all transmigrants have come from the local population, although above target
percentages have been achieved in the more recent Jayapura settlements (Table
5.3).
Table 5.3 Local participation in transmigration settlements, 1982/83-August 1986
Region Local
transmigrants
(translokat)
All
transmigrants
Local as a
percentage
of total
No. * No %
Merauke 127 6 3631 27 3
Sorong 445 20 2558 20 17
Jayapura 800 36 3284 25 28
Manokwari 524 23 1878 14 24
Nabire 274 12 1535 12 18
Fak-Fak 76 3 320 2 24
All Irian 2246 13,206 17
Jaya
Source: Irian Jaya, Kanwil Transmigrasi, Laporan Tahunan Transmigrasi Tahun Anggaran 1985/1986,
Jayapura, 1986.
In the Merauke region the Marind people have a long history of suspicion of
outsiders and have shown little interest in changing their traditional agricultural
patterns to become padi farmers (Boelaars 1986). But even in other regions where
the program would appear to have been more successful, there have been
problems in assimilating the local population with new settlers and encouraging
commercially-oriented food crop production. In some areas, Nimbokrang in
particular, local transmigrants have become commercial farmers selling vegetable
crops to urban areas and generating considerable cash income. At Koya most of
the local transmigrants are not from the Skou tribe, the original inhabitants of the
region, but from other areas in the Jayapura region and include several ex-civil
servants24 A similar pattern appears to have occurred in many areas of Sorong
24 See also Mubyarto's interview with Tempo (23 February 1984: 82). In Koya Barat, for example, only
10 of 75 local transmigrants were reported to be Skou people (Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18), December
1985: 44.
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where a considerable number of local transmigrants consist of non-Irian born
residents already settled in Sorong.25 But even in cases where the local population
have, at least initially, accepted the government's offer of places in the
transmigration sites, many have done so on a nominal basis only. Numerous
examples, confirmed by our field trips to transmigration sites at Arso (Jayapura),
Semangga (Merauke) and Aimas I-IV (Sorong) in August-September 1986, are
given by observers of translokals returning to live in their original kampungs. Even
if they have remained in the original transmigration houses, few appear to have
cultivated plots allocated to them, preferring rather to continue traditional
hunting, fishing and sago gathering activities (in spite of increased difficulty in
obtaining a subsistence from these sources).26
Why has the translokal program faced so many difficulties? The problems faced
by the program are very similar to those encountered elsewhere in Indonesia and
in many programs aimed at bringing about rapid change in economic activities
among groups with very different agricultural and associated economic pursuits
to those in sawah areas. It should seem hardly surprising that local people, having
observed major problems faced by new transmigrants in many areas in the early
years— the numerous padi harvest failures in various locations near Sorong and
Merauke—might have opted for well tried, less risky means of earning a living.
New farming activities, especially sawah rice cultivation, require a major change
not only in techniques of farming but also patterns of labour and social-economic
organization. The relatively scarce supply of agricultural extension workers,
grappling with problems arising from largely untried rice varieties and planting
schedules in new locations, delays in the 'dropping' of major inputs and major
pest problems, have often been unable, moreover, to devote intensive attention to
the translokal farmers. Other factors specific to the transmigration settlements have
also played a part. These include: standard housing models (in contrast to raised
structures in traditional settlements) unsuited to the local environment and
frequently exposed to flooding; unfamiliarity with Javanese language, the lingua
franca in many of the new settlements27; transmigrant customs which have made
many Malay speaking Irianese uncomfortable in the new locations; and poor
health conditions leading especially to the malaria outbreaks in several locations.
Overall the common government complaint that the 'locals are lazy' might be
better expressed as a rational response to highly uncertain agricultural systems
often little adapted to the local environment or designed to utilize the skills and
knowledge of indigenous inhabitants.
The much publicized suggestion by Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia
(IGGI) Chairman Mrs Schoo during a visit to Irian Jaya in April 1986 that the
indigenous component of the transmigration settlements be increased to 50 per
cent, therefore seems hardly a solution to the problem. Adicondro (1986b) notes
that the Provincial Governor Isaac Hingdom has requested that the central
government make available 25 per cent of the transmigration budget to the
provincial government to be allocated by kabupaten officials for resettlement and
associated rural development programs according to the needs of local
25 For example, half of the local transmigrants interviewed by van der Leeden (1984) at Kalobo,
Salawati were from other parts of eastern Indonesia, mainly Bugis and several from Java. For
example, half of the local transmigrants interviewed by van der Leeden (1984) at Kalobo, Salawati
were from other parts of eastern Indonesia, mainly Bugis and several from Java.
26 Various examples from Sorong, Arso and Koya are given in Kabar Dari Kamjnmg 3 (18), December
1985 and 2 (11/12), 1984. See also van der leeden (1984).
Mubyarto also reports lack of fluency in Indonesian among many Javanese settlers as a major
obstacle to integration in the transmigration sites (Tempo 23 February 1984).
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populations in the vicinity of transmigration areas. Not unexpectedly the
transmigration department has not been enthusiastic about losing such a large
proportion of its Irian Jaya budget. It has begun, however, to move in a similar
direction with recent budget allocations in Merauke and Sorong being made for
the improvement of existing settlements (improved housing, drainage and
infrastructure) close to the transmigration sites. In both areas local officials report
this program to be far more successful than attempts to encourage translokals to
join the new settlements.
Improved infrastructure, roads linking the transmigration settlements to urban
centres and the establishment of schools and health centres in the transmigration
areas, have also provided benefits to the local population.28 But new employment
opportunities for Irianese which might have been expected to result from the
more intensive linkages between transmigration sites and urban areas have been
limited by domination of urban employment by spontaneous migrants from
elsewhere in Indonesia. Construction work on the transmigration sites and
associated infrastructure has largely provided jobs for migrant labour, contract
teams mainly from south Sulawesi. Perhaps of more general significance has been
the concentration of a wide range of government efforts, especially in agriculture
and animal husbandry, in investment and extension in the transmigration areas
resulting in relative neglect of efforts to develop productivity and incomes of the
very different agricultural systems in which the indigenous population
participate. In the major transmigration receiving areas of Merauke and Sorong,
kabupaten agricultural offices seem to have largely concentrated their efforts
developing viable agricultural systems and dealing with frequent crises,
particularly in padi production, in the transmigration areas. Delivery of farm
animals, most notably draft animals for agricultural production, through the
Animal Husbandry Office has also concentrated on transmigration areas. Official
data suggest that a high proportion of farm animals (50 per cent in the case of
cattle and almost 100 per cent in the case of goats) provided to rural areas by the
Animal Husbandry Office under credit and production sharing arrangements had
been allocated to transmigration sites to the end of 1985.
The provincial government is now beginning to place greater attention on
regional development at a kabupaten level and on linkages between the
transmigration sites and indigenous communities. The World Bank is currently
engaged in drawing up a regional development plan for the entire Merauke
region both to assist second stage development in the transmigration sites and to
strengthen linkages with the activities of the local inhabitants.
Overall, therefore, one might conclude that the transmigration program has
made a significant contribution to fulfilling provincial government objectives of
providing foodstuffs to urban populations. Well over half of the estimated
provincial milled rice production (about 10,000 tonnes) and soya bean production
(about 5000 tonnes, and a significant proportion of corn and peanut production,
derived from transmigration areas in 1985. Although it has not had a substantial
impact on Irian Jaya's dependence on imported foodstuffs, most notably rice,
from other provinces in Indonesia, it has helped (together with more regular
inter-island shipping services) to reduce irregularity in supplies and price
instability of major food commodities sold to urban consumers. The program has
also been associated with extension of road transportation linking rural
Although the extension of roads has also had unintended social consequences in some areas, for
example the disappearance of local markets and meeting places such as has occurred at Waris in the
border region north of Jayapura (see Kabar Dari Kampung 3 (18), December 1985: 47-8).
60 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRIAN JAYA
communities to nearby urban centres, cheaper supply of consumer goods to
selected inland areas and facilitating the marketing of agricultural products to the
towns.
Despite early problems in many locations, the program has also probably
succeeded in raising incomes of considerable numbers of poor Javanese. But it has
been the transmigrants from Java together with 'spontaneous' migrant traders,
transport and construction workers who have largely benefited from the new
infrastructure and commercial activities stimulated by the program. The Irianese
population living close to the new settlements or living in them as local
transmigrants have yet to derive significant economic benefits either through
trade and wage labour, or through adoption of new farming practices. The latter
in particular would appear to require far more intensive extension and support
activities than have been offered so far to the local population, and the
development of programs of assistance which build on the traditional
agricultural, hunting and fishing skills and economic organization. It seems likely
that tree crop cultivation under the PIR-BUN scheme may be a more appropriate
model than the food crop systems established so far, although much greater
dependence of the local population on wage labour and incomes from an
uncertain single income source, and the potential harmful environmental effects
of the new plantation system, excessive pesticide use and the new processing
plants, suggest that it might not be a panacea to solving transmigration
problems2* But this will not obviate the need to carefully plan longer-term
strategies in selection and preparation of sites and to strengthen linkages between
the economic changes brought about through transmigration and the economic
activities of the local population.
Adicondro's (1986b: 81-2) suggestion that future sites be planned through a
systematic, prior evaluation of potential conflicts arising from differences in social
and ecological perceptions of both transmigrant and the local inhabitants is one
way in which benefits to the local population could be increased and backwash
effects minimized. Such an approach inevitably means disposing of rigid physical
targets. Revision of REPELITA IV targets is a welcome move in this direction,
both in the long-term interests of transmigrants and the indigenous Irianese
population. However, a much more fundamental reassessment of ways in which
the new settlements can serve the multiple goals of regional and local
development, and of increasing both transmigrant and Irianese welfare, is
urgently required within the overall framework of provincial and national
planning.
29 See especially Adicondro (1987) and Tanah Air 6 (67), October 1986.
CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusions
Development programs have faced enormous difficulties in Irian Jaya. More than
in any other province in Indonesia, constraints imposed by a harsh physical
environment and dispersed settlement patterns have continued to limit the
impact of government expenditures and private sector investment on incomes
and welfare. Together with the complex and often disturbed nature of political
economic integration within Indonesia, these have greatly complicated efforts to
promote economic advancement.
Government programs have not faltered through lack of funds. Although
government per capita expenditures have been much smaller than in
neighbouring Papua New Guinea in recent years,1 per capita grants made by the
central government have been considerably higher than in most other provinces.
In the absence of significant autonomous private sector investments outside the
scattered resource-based industries, government spending has been the major
stimulus for economic change and employment growth within the province.
Nevertheless, the impact of government efforts has been spread quite unevenly.
They have encouraged investment and employment in trade, transport and
construction in major urban centres, and growth in agricultural production and
associated activities in hinterland areas close to the towns. But poor
communications and the high cost of infrastructure development in inland areas
have hampered the effects of urban growth and government spending on the
rural population. The most important elements of change here have been the
spread of primary schooling and administration, a range of decentralized mission
and non-government organization activities aimed at promoting the welfare of
villagers, and not always favourable economic change stimulated by the activities
of mining, oil and logging companies in dispersed locations.
In recent years very large expenditures on establishing transmigration
settlements located for the most part close to urban centres have also contributed
to a strengthening of linkages between selected towns and certain rural areas
facilitating the spread of government services and commercial activity. Much
closer integration of the major urban economies with eastern Indonesia and Java
has paved the way for an increasingly prominent role played by migrant labour
and capital from other parts of Indonesia. The inflow of skills and cheap labour
has been a major stimulant to urban economic growth. But it has also limited the
impact which government expenditures could have otherwise had on
employment and incomes of the indigenous population, especially dampening
the effect which new employment opportunities might have had on rural
economic change through an increased flow of Irianese labour into the towns and
remittances to their villages of origin. The constraints which the presence of
migrant labour have placed on efforts to raise indigenous incomes have been
heightened by the continuing large number of non-Irianese in government and
1 Total government expenditure per capita in Papua New Guinea was about USS200-250 compared
with planned expenditures of around US$125 and actual expenditures of less than SUS100 per capita
in Irian Jaya in the mid 1980s. See Goodman, Lepani and Morawetz (1985: 57) for data on government
expenditure in Papua New Guinea.
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the expansion of the transmigration program from the late 1970s. The dominant
role which migrants have played in the centres of economic change has
undoubtedly contributed to a degree of disenchantment of many Irianese,
especially the growing number of secondary school and tertiary graduates, with
the development effort in Irian Jaya over the past 15 years. Any attempt to directly
control the volume of 'spontaneous' migration is unlikely to be successful, but
coordinated government support for positive discrimination in favour of Irianese
in educational enrolments and in the labour market would seem to be well justified
on the grounds of equity, bearing in mind the potential social and political
consequences of a continuation of past t rends in Irian Jaya.
The root causes of dissatisfaction with gains to Irianese from development
programs go beyond the issue of migration from elsewhere in Indonesia, or rather
simplistic racial stereotyping (Malay versus Melanesian) and reference to inherent
geopolitical obstacles to integration which have been highlighted by many foreign
observers, and also used to justify a large military presence and tight controls of
security in Irian Jaya. There is a genuine concern for the welfare of the Irianese
population, and a commitment to minimizing the backwash effects of economic
change on the local population, among many government officials and some
private entrepreneurs. But practices adopted by construction companies and
several large resource-based investors, especially the logging companies, have
often paid scant attention to indigenous welfare and traditional economic practices.
Continuing land compensation problems, a marked preference for employment of
migrant labour, low wages and employment practices in conflict with basic labour
protection legislation, and little respect for the environmental impact of
construction activities have all played a part.
In development projects, failure to take account of local interests in the planning
and execution of projects has been partly related to rigid physical targets set within
the one-year budget allocation framework. Further problems have arisen from
substantial delays in the release of funds from Jakarta necessitating rushed
completion of work. They have also been exacerbated by Jakarta-centred planning
and, in most large projects, involvement of contractors unfamiliar with local
conditions.
There has been a growing awareness of many of these problems and exposure of
some of the worst abuses by private companies in local research reports, seminars
and national press coverage. Non-government organizations have played an
increasingly important role in recent years in publicizing the abuses and lobbying
the provincial and central government (especially through the Ministry of
Population and Environment) to take action. Apart from church based
organizations, a new type of citizen-based largely secular and community oriented
non-government organization has emerged in Irian Jaya in recent years (of which
the Irian Jaya Rural Community Development Foundation, YPMD, and the
recently opened chapter of Legal Aid Institute (LBH) are prime examples). Their
activities are widespread in the Jayapura, Merauke and Jayawijaya regions and
they cooperate closely with church based groups (and both of these with various
government projects) as well as acting as watchdogs over the excesses of
government and private sector activities. It is too early to see whether such
developments will have a significant effect, especially given the pecuniary interests
of quite powerful government officials and private organizations and individuals,
but they have undoubtedly forced some private and official companies to tread
more warily. Greater reliance on Irian based contractors, increased provincial
government involvement in execution of development programs, and more
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coordination between government departments, especially in the transmigration
program, are also reported to have improved the quality of some development
projects.
Finally, an overall evaluation of the impact of development programs in Irian
Jaya cannot be divorced from the long history of political action and armed
resistance to integration within Indonesia through the activities of the OPM.
There is little evidence that the threat to security posed by sporadic but
continuing operations of the OPM has been brought under control in recent years
by repeated efforts on the part of the Indonesian military (Osborne 1985). One
Irian-born, Jakarta based journalist has drawn attention to the climate of fear and
apathy prevailing in many rural areas as a consequence of a long period of armed
conflict and the often harsh actions of the military, suspicious of the allegiance of
villagers to the OPM cause (Kompas 17 April 1984). Continuation of the military
conflict severely limits the scope of development programs and the activities of
government personnel, teachers, health workers and administrators in rural areas.
Strong political commitment to a coordinated effort to raise the welfare of
Irianese, and to stamp out the abuses of private companies, local officials and
military, would seem to be a precondition for winning the support of the
indigenous population and encouraging participation in development programs.
Annex
Table Al Annual growth rates of the Irian Jaya population, 1971-80
Actuala
1971-80
Projected
1980-90
Urbanb population
Irian born 3.7 33
Non-Irian born:
Java 3.3 8.0
Sulawesi 13.9 12.0
Maluku 9.9 8.0
Other 53 5.0
Subtotal 87 99
All urban 5.0 53
Rural0 population
Irian born 1.9 2.2
Non Irian born:
Transmigrant (26) (24)
Others (15) (10)
Subtotal 23.0 21.0
All rural 2.1 33
All Irian Jaya 7J 3.9
a Except for non Irian migrants in rural areas.
b Urban: the growth rates for all non Irian born are based on 1971-80 trends with the exception of the
Java born figure which is estimated to rise considerably as a consequence of the transmigration
program. Total urban growth rates are based on the NUDS projections 1980-2000 and growth of the
Irian born population derived as a residual.
c Rural: transmigration growth rates assume a continuation of the same trend in 1979-86 for the period
1986-90. Other migrant growth rates rising from a small base in 1980, are arbitrarily assumed to rise at
a high rate of 10 per cent associated with swakarsa transmigration settlement and spontaneous
migrant settlers (mainly from South Sulawesi) establishing cash crop farms in urban fringe areas. Irian
born growth rates are assumed to rise slightly as a consequence of the net impact of lower levels of
mortality. All rural and total population rates are derived as a residual.
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